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Abstract
This study critically reviews the discussion about centrrl bank independence. We use a distinction
between various aspects of centml bank independence (personnel, financial and policy
independence) in analyzing the literature. Our survey deals with four issues. Fint, we start with a
review of the theoretical case for central bank independence. Next, we discuss how central bank
independence ha.c been measured. Then, we continue with a discussion of empirical studies on the
relationship between centr~l bank autonomy and economic performance. Finally, we deal with the
question as the why central bank independence varies across countries or, in other words, the
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In recent years academics and policymakers have shown increasing interest in the ittdependence of
cenlral banks with re.cpect to the fonrwdatioo of monetary policy. In the European Union this was
rcalized by the Treaty of Maastricht on the Ecaamic and Monetary Union (EMU). Accading to
the Treaty, with the entrance of the thitd stage of EMU a European Central Bsnk (ECB) shauld be
establishcd which will corKhtct the common monetsuy policy within the Union in a oompktely
independent way. Also. some Central European countries. e.g. the Czech republic and Hongary,
have choaen for an autonanous central bank.
Moreover, in most Anglo-Saxon oountries the independenx and accountability of the oentral bank
is recently discussed too. The public debate in the Unitcd Kingdom seems to kad to a tttore
independent position of the Bank of England, wher~eas the position of the U.S. Federal Reserve
System has come under fire by critizism from Congrexs.
71ds xtudy analyzes the pro.e and cons of an autononaus central bank fratt various pentpectives.
Both theoretical and empirical arguments in favour of central bank independence arc discussed
extensively. Furthermore, the well-known indices developed in the literature for measuring the
independence of central bonks are reviewed and critiud. Next, we investigate the ultirnate
detertninants of central bank independence. At the end of our atudy, we try to answer the question
whether an independent central bank is desirabk.
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previous drafts of this study. We are especially gr~eful to Onno de Beaufort Wijnholds. Akx
Cukierman, Paul de Gnwwe, Gert-Jan van 't Hag, Mareo Hoeberichts, Lex Hoogduin, André Icard,
Otmar Issing, hlip de Kam, Peter Kenen, Mervyn King, David Laidkr, Manfn~d Neumann, Ad van
Rict, Eric Schaling, Helmut Schlesinger, Pierre Siklos, Dave Smant, Carl Walsh, Nout Wellink,
Tony Yatex, lean Zwahlen, and an arwnymous referee. Of course, the views expressed in this study
an; solely the responsibility of the authors and should not be interpreted as tefkcting the views of
any of these scholars and policymakers or their institutions.
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4"THE ONLY GOOD CEN7RAL BANK IS ONE THAT CAN SAY NO TO POLITICIANS"
The Economisr, lOrh Februury I990, p. IO
1. 1NTRODUC170N
Under the Treaty of Maastricht, signed in December, 1991, price stability will be the only
objective of the future European System of Central Banks (ESCB), which consists of the European
Centml Bank (ECB) and the national central banks of all Member States of the European Union.
Furthertnore, the Treaty spells out various provisions to ensure that the ESCB be independent. It is
often argued that a high level of independence coupled with some explicit mandate for the central
bank to aim for price stability constitute important institutional devices to maintain price stability.
The position of Ihe Deutsche Bundesbank is often mentioned as an example par excellence. The
German central bank is n;latively autonomous; at the same time, Germany has one of the best post
World War II inflation records among OECD countries. As a matter of fact, the statutes of the
ECB are largely modeled after the law goveming the Bundesbank.
Most observers think that an independent centtal bank can give priority to a low level of
inflation, whereas in countries with a more dependent central bank other considerations (like re-
election perspectives of politicians, a low level of unemployment) may interfere with the objective
of price stability. Still, impressionistic observation suggests that legal central bank independence
may be neither necessary, nor sufficient to establish low inflation rates. While Japan, for instance,
has a relatively dependent central bank, is has also an average inflation rate which belongs to the
lowest within the whole OECD area. On the other hand, Greece has a relatively independent
central bank according to Cukiertnan's (1992) ranking and quite high inflation. These observations
are, however, not inconsistent with the view that, other things being the same, greater centrdl bank
independence is conducive to lower inflation rates (Cukierman, 1992).
This study critically reviews the discussion about central bank independence. Since the second half
of the 1980s, on this topic quite a few theoretical and empirical studies have been published. It is
noteworthy, that most authors do no provide a clear definition of central bank independence.
According to Friedman (1962), central bank autonomy refers to a relationship between the central
bank and the govemment, which can be compared with that between the judiciary and govemment.
The judicature only can rule on the basis of laws provided by the legislature, and the judicature
can only be forced to rule differcntly through a change of the law. In fact, central bank indepen-
5dena; referx to throe aroax in which the influcnce of govenunent nwat ezcluded or drastically
curtaikxl (sce also Hassc, I~)O):
- independence in personnel mattera:
-financiar autonomy:
- lx~ricy independence.
In practice, it is not fr,asible to ezclude governmem influence compktely when appointmans are
nmde to such an impott:u~t public inatitution. Governmental inlluence (penconnel independena) can
than 6e discerned on the bnsis of the following criterist:
a) RepreseMation of government. Does a reptesetMative of the government have a seat ard a vote
on the governing body of the central bank7
b) AppoiMment procedures. Ate appointmeots to the goveming boatd punely made by the
governrttent or does the central bank also have a say in the nmtter!
c) Term of officx. The xhorter the term of office is, the greater will be the influence of
government on appointees, especially where rc-ekrtion is permitted.
d) Dismixsal. t..an appoinlments be revoked for ather reasons than civil or criminal offences (e.g.
if the central bank fails to meet policy objoctives)?
A further way in which the government can ezercise influetKx over the caNral bank exists if the
govemment is abk to finance its expenditure either dinxtly or indinxtly via central bank crcdits
(financial independence). Direct access to central bnnk crodits implies that mooetary policy is
xubordinatecl to fiscal ~licy. tndinxt aoo~ may roxult if the central bank is cashier to the
govetnmem or if it responsible for the management of governrttcnt debt. In these c~aes testrictions
may be neccesaary to qevent governrnent interferencx.
F'inally, policy independence is rolated to the rnom for manoeuvte in the formulation and
execution of monetary policy. As pointed out by Debelk and frischer ( 1994) and Fischer (1995) it
may be useful to draw distinction between goa! independence and insrnrmenwl i~ettdatce. With
respect to goal independenoe two related is.wes are important. F'irat, the scope for the central bank
to exercise its own dice:retion, and secad, whether the central bank has monetary atability as its
primary goal. If the central bank has boen given various goals - like bw inflation ancl low
unempbyment - it has óccn axotded the grcatest possibk scope for discretion. It couW, for
in.stance, decide that price swbility was kas important than output stability, and act atxotdingly. In
that case the central bank has gosl independenx sincx it is free to set the fittal goals of monetary
policy. The central bank'x discretionary powers may be restricted by giving it either general or
specific objectivex with respect to prioe stability. F'inally, a exntral bank must dispose over
cl7uclive inatrurnents in iMtkr lo dcfund itx obj~xKiv~Ks). A bank Ihat has insttum~.rot indepemkm-r
6is free to choose the means by which it seeks to achieve its goals. It is clear that if government has
to approve of the use of policy instruments, there is no instrument independence.~ Nowadays, the
Reserve Bank of New Zealand, whose goal is precisely described in a contract with the
government, has no goal independence; however, it has inswment independence since it chooses
the method by which it tries to achieve this goal.
In this survey we will use this distinction between various aspects of central bank independence in
revíewing the literature. Our survey deals with four issues. In chapter 2 we start with a review of
the theoretical case for central bank independence. In the economic literatute various arguments
have been put forward to explain why countries with a relatively independent central bank may
have a better inflation performance than countries where politicians have control over the central
bank. These arguments very often refer to one or more specific aspects of central bank
independence. Although central bank independence may improve upon the inflation performance, it
may also have less desirable consequences in tenns of lower and more volatile economic growth
rates.
Next, we discuss how centml bank independence ha.c been measured. Four widely used indices
of central bank autonomy are critically reviewed in chapter 3. These independence measures have
been developed by Alesina (1988, 1989), Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991), Eijffinger and
Schaling (1992, 1993a) and Cukierman (1992), respectively. Although these measures have been
constructed in a similar way, it is shown that in fact they are rather divergent in Iheir ranking of
central banks. !t is also shown that the measures vary considerably with respect to the various
aspects of central bank independence that are taken into account in constructing them.
We continue with a review of empirical studies on the link between central bank autonomy
and economic performance. Chapter four starts with a discussion of the relationship between
centrnl bank independence and the level and variability of inFlation, followed by a review of the
link with the level and variability of economic growth. Hen: we also deal with the question
whether central bank independence reduces disinflation costs. Finally, we briefly dwell upon
studies dealing with the link between central bank independence and other variables, like interest
rates and govemment budget deficits.
Finally, chapter 5 deals with the question as to why central bank independence varies across
countries or, in other words, the determinants of centrel bank independence. This issue has only
It will be clear that if the central bank is obliged to finance budget deficits, there is also no
instrument independence. In that sense financial independence and instrument independence are
related; instrument independence is, however, much broader because it includes also thc power
to determine interest rates.
7ro~xntly boen put on ttw t~carch agenda.
82. THEORETICAL CONSIDEItATIONS ON CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE
2.1 Inflation
Many observers believe that countries with an independent central bank have lower levels of
inflation than countries with a central bank which comes under direct control of the govemment.
Why would central bank independence, ceteris paribus, yield lower rates of inflation7 In the
literature three answers have been given to this question: public choice arguments, neasons which
are based on the time inconsistency problem of monetary policy and the analysis of Sargent and
Wallace ( I 981).
According to the `older' puólic choice view, monetary authorities are exposed to strong political
pressures to behave in accordance with the govemment's preferences? Monetary tightening
aggravates the budgetary position of government: the reduction in tax income brought by a
temporary slow-down of economic activiry, possibly lower receipts from 'seigniorage' (see below)
and the short-run increase in the interest burden on public debt all worsen the deficit. So
government may prefer 'easy money'. Indeed, there exists some evidence that even the relatively
independent Federal Reserve caters to the desires of the President andlor the Congress. This
evidence is either based on close inspection of the contacts between the polity and the central bank
(see e.g. Havrilesky, 19933, and Akhtar and Howe, 1991) or builds on tests whether monetary
policy turns expansive before elections as predicted by Nordhaus's (1975) political business cycle
theory (see e.g. Allen, 1986), or diverge under administrations with different political orientation,
as predicted by Hibbs's (1977) partisan theory (see e.g. Alesina, 1988). At this stage, it suffices to
2 As Buchanan and Wagner (1977, pp. 117-18) put it: "A monetary decision maker is in a
position only one stage removed from that of the directly elected politician. He will nortnally
have been appointed to office by a politician subject to electoral testing, and he may even
serve at the pleasure of the latter. It is scarcely to be expected that persons who are chosen as
monetary decision makers will be the sort that are likely to take policy stances sharply contrary
to those desired by their political associates, especially since these stances would also run
counter to strong public opinion and media pressures ... `Easy money' is also `easy' for the
monetary manager .. .
3 Havrilesky (1993) even argues that "the contemporary view is Ihat the Administration, while
granting significant leeway to the Fed, when necessary obtains the monetary policy actions that
it desires" (P. 30).
9conclude tlwt, of courxe, the mae independent a caNral b~ank is, the k:ss it will be txtder the spell
d political ieftuarces as autlined above. It wilt 6e ck~r tbM this argumeat d Bucáanan and
Wagner relatex primarily to paxotmel indepatdaioe and to Pdtcy indepatdptoa4 71te nwte
influencial governt~aM ix in appoitMiag board membas. the rnose likdy N wiQ be that We caMral
bank punuex the kind d policies desirod hy gwranmaM.
A ximihr liae d twMOning ax in Bnclmmn asd Wagner (1977) can bc fatwd ia tbe literodue
originatittg with Kydbmd and Pteacau (197'1). Calvo (1978) atd Bano and Gotdon (1983). Cataal
in this litaaaue is Ihe socalled dynamic or rLtte ~ Problea,. Dynamic iaoo~y
arisa when the best plan atmattly made for same fitdre petiod, is no looga optimal what dut
period awally atatts. Various eadels have ban ón~ed upoa dNS dyarnic wtoo~sistarcy apProach
(soe e.g. RogofF. 19g3: Cukierman, 1992: Eijfimger atd Schalittg. 1993b and Sdtaliag. 1995).
Basically, in these modehi the govanment and tke pnblic ate dtawe is~1o some se~ing d the
priauner's dikartma. The vsrious models difkr in theK assumptions with tegard b governntent
incentives. Folkiwing Cukierman (1992, cMpser 2). we will illuctnle the dyttanrc inconsi:tency
problem first for the casoe d mon~ary stafptises aimed to inarase empbyment. Subaeqaakly, otber
governmeM matives wil) be teviewed.
d ix aawmod he~c thw deviatiomt d empbymenl from itx natutal Icvel are positively related to
unanticipNod inftatiat. 7itix fdlows from the ezistenoe d nomiml wage oontracts in eonjtmction
with a teal wage which á nartnally above dte market-ck.ariag aeal wage. Pblicymatas have an
objective funáion that givex a positive weigM ro stimutating employmeat (e.g. ó~ecause d rc-
ekx,tion considentiomc. ar for partisan neasons) and a neplive weigM to inflatian. Prior ro the
deu:rmination d twtmrial coabacts. the bat rate d inflatioa for policymakas is atYO. At the
beginoing d the paiod. empbyers and anpbyees btttgaia over notmnal wapes. takMó the
ezpected a1e d inflsiioa into aooount. Dtring this period goverantent daoses a ta0e d monelary
ezptnxion that mazimixa itx abjectives, uking inflatio~ary ezpeclations as given. 7Ue beat tate d
inftation is ddermined au ss to minimize the cwmmbiaod cosu d inflstion and low empbymeet.
Neuewwt (1991) emplws'rma the Peraonnel indepatdenoe d the governing btwd d the centnl
benk: 'The caáitions d cotNnct and d ofï~oe wouki have to be set soeh that the appoiMee
froes him- or herself hom all forms political ties or depatdencies aed aooepts the ceMral
bank': abjeaive d uafeguarding the vatue d the cumency as his or her professioaal kitmotif.
We may call thix a"IUomas-Beckat' effect.' (P. 103). Wallex ( 1992b) develop: a model for
appoiMments ro the caNral bank in the caMezt d a two-party political system, in which the
victor d the laxt ekxtion is albwed b aomittale candidates. bu1 the kxittó Pwty is given the
right to canfirm the oominees. An intaeating outcome d the model is that if society wama ro
minimize partisan monetary Pdicy, it xhatki iaxease tbe kmgth d dfice d oattral baek
pulicy board membetz relative to the kmgth d the electoral iaterval.
10Since the marginal costs of inflation and low employment are increasing, the minimizing rate of
inflation is positive. However, since it is assumed that employers and employees know the
objectives of the policymakers, they can deduce in advance what the rate of inflation will be, once
they have settled their nominal wage contracts. They therefore adjust nominal wages so as to
achieve the real wage that they originally aimed at. Consequently, employment remains at its
natural level. So, govemment ends up with a higher rate of inflation, without employment being
higher than its natural level.
The other sources of the time inconsistency problem originate with the public finances, and can
be illustrated as follows. Define real govetnment debt b as b- Blp, where B denotes nominal debt,
and p is the price level. We may write the change in real debt as:
A6 - d t(i - APIP)b - ~M~p (1)
where d is the real primary deficit, i is the nominal interest rate and M is the stock of base money.
It follows from equation (1) that the govemment receives a capital gain if the actual inflation rate
exceeds the inflation premium in the interest rate. The dynamic inconsistency of monetary policy
arises, because the incentíves for the govemment to inflate change before and after the public has
settled for a nominal interest rate, taking into account their expected rate of inflation. Before the
public commits itself, the central bank has an incentive to abstain from making inflation. After
positions in govemrnent bonds have been taken, policymakers have an incentive to create inflation.
A third reason for the time inconsistency problem also originates in the finances of government
and may be referred to as the 'revenue' or 'seigniorage' motive for monetary expansion (Barro,
1983). Seigniorage (S) is generally defined as the amount of real resources bought by the
government by means of new base money injections, or:
S - AM~p ~ (~Ml~ (MIP) ~ (~Ml~ L(p7 (2)
where L denotes the demand for real base money balances, which in turn depends upon expected
inflation p`~. The dynamic inconsistency of monetary policy arises here, because incentives for the
government to inflate change before and after the public has chosen the level of real money
balances. Before the public commits itself to a given level of real balances, government takes into
consideration the downward effect that a higher rate of inflation has on real money balances. After
this choice has been made, however, govemment takes the level of real money balances as given
and will reoptimize (Cukierman, 1992, chapter 4).
No matter what exactly causes the dynamic inconsistency problem, in all cases the rrsulting
rate of inflation is sub-optimal. This conclusion generally also holds in models with incomplete
11infixmation. Cukicrnwn (IrKYL, ciwptcr 18), for imwnce, provides a mockl in which the public is
nul I'ully inkxmul aMwt Ihc shifting objectives of the political uuthorities and in which there is no
perfect ccmtrol of inkxnwuion. Barm and Gordon (1983) conc:lude that Ihe best solulion for the
time inconsiuency pn~bk~m consists of the introduction of fixed ruk.c in monetary policy, i.e. the
authorities rnmmit thcm~clves to cerWin policy ruks. Once uncertainty is introduced and the kvel
of output is affected by shocks, the ca.ce becomes one for a Feedback rule, in which monetary
policy optimally rexponds to shocks. The problem wilh ruks, however, is the absenx of some
higher authority Io enforce a commitment. Handing over authority to the central bank by political
aulhexitics may help hcn:, since it c:m bc rCgarck~ as :m act of partial commitment (Rogoff, 19R5;
Ncumann, 1991 ancl Cukicrman, 1992, chapter 18). By dekg:King some of their authority to a
rclativcly apolilical institution, politicians accept certain restrictions on their fu[urc fttxdom of
:K:tion.5 Thc degrt~ of u~ntml bcmk indcpertclencx, of ax~rse, only plays a meaningful rok if the
cuntrrl bank puts different empha.cix un alternative policy objextives than the government does.
Two main differencex have been pointed out in the literaturc (Cukiemian, 1992, chapter 18). One
relates to possibk differcnces between the rate of time preference of political authorities and that
of centrrl banks. For various rea.wns, central banks are often morc conservative and tend to take a
longer view of the policy proce.c. than do politicians. The other difference concems the subjeetive
weights in the objcelivc function of the central bank and that of the govemment. It is often
a..wmcd that central banken are rclatively more concemed about inflation than about other policy
goals such a.c achieving high employment kvels and adequate govemment rcvenues. If nwnetary
policy is set at the di.cn:tion of a conservative central banker, a lower average time-consistent
inflation rate will rosult~'~ From the foregoing analysis it will be clear that this argument for
ccMral bank independenu; is primarily related to policy independence. The best way to
5
e
An alternalive wlulion to thP time inconsistency problem is reputation building (Canzoneri,
1985), Frati:mni and Huang (1994) show, however, ttwt in case of asymmetric infomiation
lhere is no assur~ncc lhat reputation may work for the central bank in the Barto-Gordon model.
Waller (1992a) analysc.c the appointment of a conservative central banker in a model that
distinguishe.c between sectors which differ in their degree of competitíveness of the labor
market. The main n;wlt of this paper is [hat, allhough agents in both sectors have the same
prcfercoces over inflation and output stability, in equilibrium nominal wage rigidity in the non-
cla.c.cical labor marlcG cau.ties output in this sector to be morc variabk than in the classical
s~;tor. Consequently, if the classical sector were allowed to choose the 'conservative' central
banker, it would choace a more vigorous inFlation fighter relative to the non-classical sector's
choice.
~ Lippi and Swank ( 1994) argue that the central banker's degrcx of conservatism (inFlation
aversion) is an efficicnt way to deal with the time inconsistency probkm and granting
(pcrvonnel) indepencknce is an efficient way to cope with the credibility problem.
12illustrate the argument is to present a'stripped' version of Rogoffs nwdel. In Rogoffs (1985)
nqdel, society can sometimes make itself better off by appointing a central banker who does not
share the social objective function, but instead places "too large" a weíght on inflstion ratt
stabili7ation relative to output stabili~ation. In this simplified version, output is given by the Lucas
suppty func[ion:
r,-~~-~~ t w, (3)
where ~ is inflation, nt` is expected inflation and ik is a productivity ahock with mean zero and
variance aN'. We set the natural level of output at zero and the parameters at one. Ti~e timing of
events in the Rogoff rtadel is as follows: first ~` is set (nominal wage contracts are signed), then
the shock ~ occurs and finally the central banker sets nc (see figure I).
Figure 1. Timiog ot events io the RogoR model
~ 2 3
~ t t
Inflatlonary e~edatlons shodc omtrs Inflstlon rate set
sct
Society's loss function is given by
L~~2a~'~(y~-3~ (4)
where the weight on output stabiliration x~ 0 and f ~ 0, so that the desired level of output, f, is
above the natural level.
Rogoff shows that it is optimal for society to choose an independent (conservative) central
banker who assign "too large" a weight to inflation in his loss function:
I~~ 128x~} Z(yr-3J2 (5)
where e, the additional weight on the inflation goai, lies between zuo and infinity (0 ~ E ~~).
Substituting (3) in (5), taking first order conditions with respect to x~ and solving for rational
ezpectations, we obtain:







Policy rule (6) shows tFwt the introduction of a conservative central banker (e ~ 0) leads to a
lower inflationary bias fxyl and a lower variance of inflation ~ x ~62~ 11te
LI ~ e J I e X
~
variance of output ~ I~ e YaN is, however, an increasing function of the conservativeness
I'e'XJ
(g)
of the central banker. 77iis is the trade off between credibility and Flezibility which is aln„ady
apparent in the Rogoff nwdel. It c:m be shown that the optimal value for e, in terms of social loss
function (4), is Ixx~ilive but finite. This implics that it is optimal for society to appoint a
conservative central banker.
Rogoff makes the crucial as.tiumption, that the centrrl banker is completely independent and
cannot be overridden ex post, when the inFlationary expectations ~` have been set and the policy
is to be carried out. 7itis can lead to large losses for society when extreme productivity shocks ly
occur. Lohmann introduces the possibility to override the central banker at a strictly positive but
frnile cost. 7lierefore, society's loss function (4) changes to
L;-2n~ `Z(y~-Ya'~8c (4')
where S is a dummy that takes on the value of I when the central bank is overridden and 0
olherwise; and c is a cost Ihat society incurs when the central bank is overtidden. '[ite central
bank's loss function (S) stays the same.
The timing of events in the Lohmann model is as follows: In the first stage the central
banker's additional wcight e on the inflation goal is chosen as well as the cost c of overriding the
a:ntr~l banker. Then the inflation expectations are set. In the third stage the productivity shock
realizes. 71ren the centrel banker sets the inflation rate, which is either accepted or not. If it is not
aca:pted, saciety oveRidex the central banker, incurs the cost c and resets the inflation rate.
Hinally, inflation and oulput realize (see figure 2).
a ~ N
14Figure 2. Timiag of eveots ia the Lohmaao modd
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In equilibrium, the central banker will not be overridden. In the case of an extreme
productivity shock he will set the inflation rate so that society is indifferent between overriding or
not. Rogoffs model is a special case of Lohmann's where c~. Lohmann shows that the optimal
central bank institution is characteriud by 0 ~ é ~~ and 0 ~ c~ t~.
An important result from the Rogoff nadel is that the reduction in the equilibrium inflation
rate n:sulting after appointing a conservative and independent central banker generally comes at the
expense of greater output variabílity from supply shocks, since the central banker offsets output
shocks to a lesser extent than governments would do. Neverthekss, gains from lower inflation
exceed losses due to decreased stability. '[iterefore, on net, society is made better off by appointing
a conservative central banker. It is, however, not optimal in the Rogoff model to appoint a central
banker whose only concern is low and stable inflation.
Apart from public choice and dynamic inconsistency considerations, there is a third argument to
explain why central bank independence may matter for inflation. This argument has first been put
forward by Sargent and Wallace (1981). They distinguish between fiscal and monetary suthorities.
If fiscal policy is dominant - i.e. if the monetary authorities cannot influence the size of the
government's budget deficit - money supply becomes endogenous. If the public are no longer able
or willing to absorb additional govemment debt, it follows from equation (I) that monetary
authorities will be forced to finance the deficit by creating money. lf, however, monetary policy is
dominant, the fiscal authorities will be forced to reduce the deficit (or repudiate part of the debt). It
is clear that the more independent the central bank is, the less monetary suthorities can be forced
to finance deficits by creating money. It is clear that this argument relates to financial
independence.
Apart from a legislative approach to crc,ate by law an indepéndent central bank and to mandate it,
also by law, to direct its policies towards achieving price stability, other mechanisrns have been
suggested to overcome the incentive problems of monetary policy. 7i~is so-called contmcting
approach regards design of monetary institutions as one that involves structuring a contract
15Fx;twecn Ihe centr,rl bank (the agent) and the govemment (the principal). The nature of the contract
will affect the incentives facing the bank and will, thereby, affect monetary policy (Walsh, 1993).
Persson and Tabellini (1993) suggest a targeting approach, where the political principals of the
central bank impose an explicit intlation target and make the central bank leadership explicitly
accountable for its success in meeting this target. Such a system exists since 1989 in New Zealand,
where the governor of lhe Reserve Bank can, under certain circumstances, be dismissed if the
inflation rrte exceeds two percent (see below for further details).
It is interesting to nole tlwt it follows fmm the analysis of Penson and Tabellini (1993) that
the optimal contract with the central bank implies no loss in terms of stabilization policy. As
pointcxt out above, this rosults contrasts with the outcomes of most models where monetary policy
is dclegated lo an independent centr~l bank, where credibility is increased at the expense of an
optimal output stabilization policy. Walsh (1993, 1995) and Persson and Tabellini (1993) show that
the optimal centrrl bank contract may serve to eliminate the inflation bias, while still preserving
the advantages of stabili~rtion. 71iis conclusion holds even if the central bank has private
informationK
A second gcrkral insight from the work of Persson and Tabellini (1993) is the importance of
monetary policy announcements. If transparont and clearly understood, policy announcetnents
cmate a reference point against which subsequent central bank behavior can be judged (see also
Crockett, 1994). The 'accountability' of the central bank must refer to policy outcomes, so that
sanctions can be imposed in case certain targets are not realized. One muy argue that, from a
ckmocrrtic point of vicw, targeting as suggested by the contracting approach is perhaps to be
preferred over the concept of a fully independent central bank with some explicit mandate for price
stabitity (see below). Tlx; contracting approach is clearly related to instrument independence but
not to goal independence~~
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Walsh (1995) also considers the situation in which candidates to head the central bmik differ in
their competency, Ihe central bank's monetary policy stance is not observable, and the
informational content of a publicly observable signal about an aggregate supply shock is
affectul both by thc central bank's competency and by its implementation of given policies. [n
lhis model the principal can induce Ihe centrrl bank to behave as demanded, by using a
contract that resembles an inflation targeting rule with a reporting requirement.
Accortling to McCullum (1995), the literature on instítutional ~arrangements for central banks is
tlawed by two fallacies pertaining to fundamental presumptions of the analysis. The literature's
standarc) interpretation is misleading in two ways: first, it underestimates the likelihood of good
monetary policy pcrfonrwnce by an independent centra) bank, and second, it misrepresents the
tx,nef"icial effects stemming from contracts between the central bank and the govemment. In
beHh ways, the literature tends to underestimate the benefits of central bank independence by
partial insulation fmm political pressures.
162.2 Inflation veriability
The preceding analysis suggests that central bank independence may reduce pre-election
manipulation of monetary policy. In that case, central bank independence may also rcsult in more
sutble money growth and, therefore, less inflation variability. 17tere is a related argument why
central bank independency may lead to less inflation variability. Politicians not only strive to
remain in office as long as possible, they are also partisan and wish to deliver benefits to their
constituencies (Hibbs, 1977). Some evidence indicates that the pattem of unemployment and
inflation tends to be systematically related to the political orientation of govemments. Whettas
right-wing governments generally are thought to give a high priority to lower inflation, left-wing
governments are often supposed to be more concemed about unemployment. Alesina (1988)
reports that the unemployment rate in the US is generally higher under Republican administrations
than it is under Democratic administmtions, whereas the inflation rate is lower in case of a
Republican president. Similar results have been reported by Tabellini and La Via (1987) and
Havrilesky (1987). Existing evidence lends support to the view that the redistributional
consequences of inflation provide an incentive for the left to endorse ezpansionary policies and for
the right to fight inflation (Alesina, 1989). This implies that, if thete is a regular change of
govemment, inflation variability may be high, especially if the monetary authorities are dominated
by elected politicians. However, a relatively independent central bank will not change its policy
after a new government has been elected. So central bank independence may reduce inflation
variability (Alesina, 1988).
Another reason why central bank independence may affect inflation variability has been put
forward by Milton Friedman (1977). Friedmun wanted to explain why there exists a positive
correlation between the level of inflation and the variability of inFlation across countries and over
time for any given country. In Friedman's anatysis a govemment may temporarily pursue a set of
policy goals (output, employment) that leads to high inflation, which subsequently elicites strong
political pressure to reduce the debasing of the cumency. The relationship between the level and
the variability of inflation has been extensively investigated. Recently, Chowdhury (1991) has
reexamined this issue for a sample of 66 countries over the 1955-85 period. His results indicate the
presence of a significant positive relationship between the rate of inflation and its variability.
2.3 Level end varisbility o[ economic growth
With respect to the effect of central bank independence on the level of economic growth two
17opposing vicws huve bu:n cxpressed in the literature. Some authors have argued that the real
interest rate depends upun money growth, i.e. they assume that the Fisher hypothesis does not hold
due to the Mundell-Tobin effect.t~ A low level of inflation which is caused by restrictive
monetary policy rexults in high real interest rates, which may have detrimental effects on the level
of investment, ancl Itence on c:conomic growth (Alesina and Summers, 1993). 'ITtere seems to be
some evidence in suplxxt of the first part of the argument: countries with a low level of inflation
have high ex post real interest rates (De Haan and Sturm, 1992).
Tlwre an;, howevcr, alw some argumenls which suggest that central bank independence may
further economic growth. First, as outlined above, an independent central bank may be less prone
to political pressures and therefore behave more predictably, which may enhance economic stability
and n:duce risk pn;mia in interest rates, thereby stimulating economic growth (Alesina and
Summers, 1993). Second, high levels of inflation may obstruct the price mechanism; it is likely
that this will hinck~r economic growth. Many economists, especially those involved in central
banking, believe however that even moderate ratex of inflation impose significant economic costs
on society (Fischer, 1993). ~~ Recently, Grimes (1991) and Fischer (1993) have provided evidence
in support of the view that inFlation hanns economic growth.t2 One channel through which this
effect may operate is irn:reased inflation uncertainty. As pointed out previously, there exists a
strong link between the level and the variability of inFlation. Strong variation may lead to high
inflation uncertainty which, in tum, may damage economic growth. If central bank independence
reduces the variability of inflation and promotes less inflation uncertainty, economic growth may
prosper. Empirical studies on the links between inflation variability and inflation uncertainty, and
economic growth pmvide, however, only mixed support for this point of view. Using annual data
for 24 countries Logue and Sweeney (198I) find, for instance, no evidence for a significant
negative impact of inflation variability on real growth. A similar conclusion is reached by Jansen
(1989). Engle (1983) found little evidence for a link between the relatively high rates of inflation
experienced by the United States in the 1970s and inflation uncertainty. However, Cukierman and
10 A rise in expected inflation will lead, according lo Mundell (I963), to substitution of liquid
a~sets by long-term financial as.cets and, acconling to Tobin (1965), to substitution of liquid
a.ticets by physicnl capital goods, lowering lhc marginal efficiency of capita) and, thereby, also
the expected (ex ante) rwl interest rates.
Fischer (1994) points out that the n;lationship betwcen inflation and economic growth may be
non-linear. Furthermore, the link between inflation and growth for low levels of inflation (1-3
percenQ is very difficult to determine empirically.
12 See, howevcr, also Karrrs (1993) who argues that the correlation reported by Grimes (1991) is
a consequence of thc cyclical character of both variables.
18Wachtel (1979) report a positive correlation between the rate of inflation and the dispersion of
inflation forecasts gathered from the Michigan and Livingston inflation surveys. Furthermore,
Evans (1991) has published evidence which is consistent with the point of view that uncertainry
about the long-term prospects for inflation is strongly linked to the actual rate of inflation.
Concerning the impact of central bank independence on the variability oj economic growth, again
various theoretical positions have been delineated. On the one hand, it is likely that recessions
occur, if the central bank introduces restrictive measures to combat inflation. In this view inflation
has become too high, since in previous periods the monetary authorities were too lax. An
independent central bank striving for price stability will not that easily let inflation run out of
control, and therefore will not follow such a stop-go policy. Con.cequently, Fluctuations in real
output will be sntaller (Alesina and Summers, 1993). On the other hand, the ntodels of Rogoff
(1985) and Eijffinger and Schaling (1993b) conclude that when the central bank gives priority to
price stability, the variability of income will be greater than in the case where the central bank also
strives for stabilization of the economy.
By now, it will have become clear, that only empirical research can prove which view is most
in accordance with the data. In chapter 4 this issue will be addressed.
2.4 Objections against centt~al bank independettce
It follows from the foregoing analysis that various theoretical arguments have been given in
support of central bank autonomy. Chapter 4 will show that countries with a relatively independent
central bank have, on average, a better inflation performance than countries where the central bank
comes under more direct control of the govemment. Furthermon:, various indications suggest that
central bank independence dces not imply sacrifices in terms of lower output growth or higher
unemployment. Two objections have been raised against central bank independence: lack of
democratic accountability and potential damage to policy coordination (Goodhart, 1994). The final
sections of this chapter will deal with both these issues.
Accountebility
An important problem is how central bank independence relates to derttocratic accountabiliry.13
Some authors have argued that monetary policy is just like other instruments of economic policy,
13 it is interesting to note that this issue is discussed mainly in the Anglo-Saxon countries
(Fischer, 1994 and Eijffinger, 1994).
19like fisc;al policy, :md should accordingly be fully determined by democratically elected
represeMatives. Such an approach implies, howevcr, a too direct involvement of politicians with
monetary policy. Neverthcles.e, in every democratic society monetary policy ultimately has to be
under the control of dcm~x:ratically elec[ed politicians. Some way or another, the central bank has
lu (x~ acccwntable. Parliunxxnt is, o( course, res(xmxihle for central bank Icgislalion. In other wordx,
the 'rules of the garrk' (i.e. the objective o( monetary pulicy) are settled in accordance with nomtal
ek;mucratic prcx:ulures, but the 'garne' (monetary policy) is delegated to the central bank. Since
parliarnent can alter this Iegislalion, the centr.:l bank remains under the ultimate control of
parliament. Funhe:rmorc, in casc the specified objective is not realized, the central bank or the
politician who bean final responsibility through his power to overrule the bank's policy, could be
made accountable.
Central bank independence and democrrtic accountability can be implemented in various ways.
Different countries have organised things differently. On the ba.cis of three relatively independent
central banks - the Dcut.cc:he Bundesbank, the Nederlandsche Bank and the Reserve Bank of New
'L.ealand - this will be exemplified now. Five aspccts of the division of responsibilities between the
gavemment and the ccntral bank are important here:14
I. The ultimate objective(s) of monetary policy. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand only has one
formal objective: pricc stability. So thetL is no goal indepcndence for the central bank. The
Bundesbank has a similar prirne objective which is, however, not ax specific (forrnally referred
to as defence of the value of the currency).~S In addition the Bundesbank has the obligation
to offer generrl support to the government's economic policy in instances in which this dces
not prejudice the primary objective of price stability (BBankG 1957, section 12). However, this
subsidiary statutory ohjeeaive is de facto not very important. The objective of the
Nedcrlandu;he Bank is to rcgulalc ttx: valuc of tlu: GuiWcr su as lo enhance welfarc (Bank
Law 1948, sec;tion 9.1). Nowadays, this obju;tive is interpre[ed as a stable exchange ratc of the
Guilder vis-á-vis thc Dmark.
2. Precision of targct specification. The governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand has to
agree with lhc govcrnment on a tight target range for inflation for the next three years. The
Bundesbank is not under any obligation to agree, obey or announce any such targets. Since
t974 lhe bank announccs the targeted rate (or zone) for money growth, which implies an
inllalion Iargct. 'I'bc fcdcral govermm:nt is rx~stx~nsible for dccisions about the exchange ratc.
14 See Roll et aL (1993).
~5 See, for instance, Caswr ( I 98 I) and Kennedy (1991).
20This has been a rea.con for many conflicts between the Bundesbank and the govemment
(Marsh, 1992).
3. Statutory basis for independence. The govemor of the central bank of New Zealand must agtee
with the govemment about a target for inflation, but is free to choose his inswments
(instrument independence; Debelle and Fischer, t994). The central bank in Germeny is
completely independent of any instnictions from govemment. It may consult the govemment
iwt it has no obligation to agree. Under seaion 13 of the BBankG 1957 government
representatives have the right to attend rtteetings of the Zentralbankrat, but not to vote. The
Dutch Bank Law dces not contain any specific articles on the statutory basis for independence.
4. Overtiding the centrrl bank. In New Zealand the govemor of the central bank can be dismissed
in case he fails to deliver the inflation target (obligation ad hominem). The contract contains
some clearly identified escape clauses (like a rise in indirect taxes, or change in exchange rate
regime). In Germany the govemment can suspend decisions of the Bundesbank for a maximum
of two wceks (BBankG 1957, section 13). This temportuy veto has never been formally
deployed. Only through a change in the relevant legislation by a simpk majority in parliament
the Bundesbank can be overruled by the government. The Zentralbankrat is ~esponsible for
monetary policy (collective responsibility). The Netherlands have a fairly unique central bank
legislation. According to section 26 of the Bank Law of 1948, the minister of Finance has the
right to give a so-called 'instruction' to the bank with regard to monetary policy.~b The right
to give instructions makes the minister responsible for monetary policy vis-S-vis
parliarnent. n
5. Appointment of bank officials. Both the minister and the board of the central bank must ratify
the appointment of the govemor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (double veto). Board
appointments are made by the finance minister. The depury governor is appointed by the
board, on recommendation of the govemor. The Centralbank Council (Zsntralbankrat) is the
governing board of the Bundesbank. Apart from the so-called Directorate (Direktorium) the
presidents of the nine Landesuntralbanken are members of the Zentralbankrat. The
Direktorium comprises of the president, the vice-president and nowadays a maximum of six
16
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This right is some kind of an `ultimum remedium' and has never been applied. In his memoirs,
Zijlstra, who was president of the Nederlandsche Bank between 1967 and 1981, reminisenses
that prime minister Den Uyl (19741977) considered to use this instrument after the bank had
introduced credit restrictions in 1977. Sce Zijlstra (1992).
This construction is no longer allowed under the Maastricht Treaty. In the third phase of EM(J.
which according to the Treaty on European Union should start no later than 1999, the night of
the minister of Finance to give instructions to the central bank must be abolished.
21otfx;r membcn, which an~ uppoinled by the prcsidcnt of [he Feder.rl Republic on nominalion of
the feck;ral govcmment.~x The Zentralbankra[ is consulted in this process. The presidents of
the Lanck~xzentralbanken are nominated by the Bundesrat (the upper federal chamber), based on
recommendationx I'rom governments of the Liinder. The Zentr.rlbankrrt is then again consulted.
The president and Ihe director-secretary of the Dutch central bank are appointed by the
minister of Hmance, on the basis of a recommendation list containing only two names, which
has been decided upon in a combined rneeting of the goveming board and the supervisory
txiard of the Bank (Bank Law, section 23). The uther mcmben of thc goveming board arc also
appointed by the minister, on the basis of a recommendation list containing three names, again
du:idul upon by thc governing and supe:rviurry boards. The so~alled Royal Commissioner is
n:.epemsible for supcrvision on behalf of ttte governmenl; he is also appointed by the minister
(Bank Law, seclions 3U; 31).
ix Until unification each of the eleven westem Liinder had its own central bank; their presidents
were member of the Zentralbankrat, as were the members of the Direktorium, which could
maximally consist of ten persons, including the president and the vice-president of the
Bundesbank. After unification the number of L~inder representatives was reduced to nine and
the maximum total for Ihe Directorate to eight. See Smith (1994).
~~Table 1. Alternative approsches to central bank independence and accountability
peulache Bundcsbonk Rea. Bank New Zcaland Nederlandsche Bank
cy objedive:
price stability primary objective sok objective if welfare enhancing
wpptxting govemtttent economic secordary objective -- -
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govemtttutt overtide only implicit (new law) provision in curtent law right to give inattuction
icy targets:
obligatory no yu no
agrad with govemment no Y~ ~
exape clauxa no ycs no
time horizon no threc years no
sponsibility:
laid upon ttntral bank council govemorof the antral bank implicitly with minista
monitoring only implicit diamisaal of govertar fa failure thtough Roysl Commiuionu
ura: based upon Roll et aL ( 1993) and the Dutch Centrel Banlc Law, 194g
Table I summarizes the preceding analysis. It follows from this table that central bank
independertce in a democratic society can be impletnented in different ways. According to the
Maastricht Treaty the European Central Bank (ECB) will become responsible for monetary policy
within the European Economic and Monetary Union. An important objection that has been raised
against the ECB is its lack af accountability (Gormley and De Haan, 1995). Irtdeed, the statutes of
the ECB imply that the democratic accountability of the ECB is poorly atrartged in comparison
with the accountability of the central banks of the countries examined in this survey. This is also
the case in comparison with the Bundesbank, since the mandate of the ECB can only be changed
through an atnendment of Ihe Treaty, which requires unanimity. In contrast, the Bundesbank
always has to take into account the possibility of a change of the law. Through this rnechanism the
Bundesbank will, in the long run, follow a policy which is in litu with the preferettces of
democratically elected politicians. In the Netherlands this political approval is arranged differently,
23but in thix country the crntral bank also pursues policies which generally enjoy broad political and
Iwpular support.
Coordination of policics~`~
Apart from the Iack of democratic accountabiliry, potential problems rrgarding the coordination of
economic policies havr been put forward a.e an important argument against central bank
indcpcndence. Whercas moxt theoretical modols discussrd so far, make no clear distinction brtween
monetary and fiscal policy, other theoretícal studíes concentrate on the conflicts that can arise
when monetary and fiscal policy are drlegated to independent institutions. Govemment controls
liscal policy and the ccmral bank controls monetary policy. Both policyrrmkers set goals for the
economy and chose thrir own priorities. The government and the central bank can either cooperate
in implementing their policics or prefer not to cooperate. In the aalysis of Andersen and Schneider
(1986) threr different mcxlels of the economy are distinguished. The first model is Keynesian in
which rvrn anticipatrd txilicy aflrcts the level of output and inFlation. In the second model, which
Andcrsrn anJ Schncider n-1er to as Kcyncsian-New Classical, anticipated monetary policy is
nculr.d; il c:m only al'fccl inllation. In Ihc thirxl, Nuw ('laxxical mixlcl Fx~th anlicipatcd monctary
anJ fïscal txilicy only aflix;t inllation and do not inllucnce output. Bo1h the govemment and the
centrrl bank establish targets for inFlation and output. Andersen and Schneider compare the
rconomic outcomes under coopemtion with lho.ce under non-cooperation. Although the equilibrium
level of oulput and Ihc ratr of inFlation vary depending on thr model used, in all three models the
cixiperativc solution ix Parrto superior to the non-cooperative solution. Furthermorc, this result is
invariunl lo thc stmcturo of non coopera[ion, í.e. Nash or Stackelhrrg. Anderxn and Schnrider
(1986) conclude thal "two independent policymakers do not automatically guarantee a policy
uutcome which is pn;ferrod to other outcomes under different institutional solutions" (p. 188).
Similar conclusíons havr hu~n drawn by olher authon (see e.g. Hughes Hallett and Petit, 1990 and
Blakc and Westaway, 1993).
However, scveral cumments are in order (ser Pollard, 1993). First, in many of these models a
third 'player', i.e. tradr unions or the general public, is not taken into account.Z~ The perception
of rconomic subjuts of the credibility of announced policies is, however, very important for
w
zo
This xction Jraws hcavily from Pollanl (1993).
This ix not true for the model of Blake and Westaway ( 1993), which is similar to that of
Barro and Gonlon ( 1983). The conclusion of these authors is lhat "it is unlikely to be sensible
to appoint a monetary awhority with an ability to make credible policy commitments if at thr
sanx~ timr it is fullowing objectíves which differ markedly from those of govrrnment itself'
(p. 79).
24macroeconomic outcomes, as we have already seen. Second, in most of these studies the
sustainability of fiscal policy is not examined. As pointed out before, this issue is analyzed by
Sargent and Wallace (1981) who have shown that, if the government embarks on a path of
unsustainable deficits, the central bank might eventually be forrxd to inflate to cover the deficit. If
the public realizes that the government debt is on such a path, it will expect inflation to increase
which may cause inFlation to increase well before some debt limit has bcen reached. Third,
uncertainly about the macroeconomic models used by the policymakers is not taken into atxount.
Frankel and Rockett (1988) have argued that this model uncertainty may eventually yield negative
outcomes in case the policymakers cooperate. Finally, in many madels analyzing coordination of
monetary and fiscal policy central bank independence is equated with non-cooperation between the
fiscal and monetary authorities in policy implementation. This definition differs from the concept
underlying empirical indices for central bank independence as discussed in the following chapter.
As pointed out by Pollard (1993), these different definitions of independence may partly explain
the diverging results of the theoretical models discussed above and of empirical studies reviewed in
chapter 4.
In a paper of Debelle (1993) some of the shortcomings of this literature are dealt with. This
author differentiates between fiscal and monetary authorities in a model in which also private
sector agents (labor and firms) are distinguished?~ He shows that apart from central bank
independence, the objectives of the fiscal authorities also inFluence the inFlation rate. Like in many
other theoretical models, central bank independence here is defined as the relative weight the
central bank places on inFlation relative to output (i.e. how `conservative' is the central bank?).
Central bank autonomy may reduce inflation, but also lead to lower social welfare, depending upon
society's loss function.22 [n other words, the optimal degree of conservatism of the central bank
depends on the society's aversion to inflation and output fluctuations. In chapter 5 we will deal
with the determinants of central bank independence.
21
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The model draws on Alesina and Tabellini (1987). A similar model is presented by Debelle
and Fischer (1994).
Output is produced by labor, whose nominal wage is pre,determined: firms maximize profits
and can hire the amount of labor they demand at the predetermined nominal wage. Social
welfare is assumed to depend upon inflation, the difference between the actual and the natural
rate of production, and the difference between the target and the actual level of govemment
spending. The fiscal authorities have a similar loss function with different weights.
Government spending is not included in the loss function of the monetary authorities. In the
simplest version of the model it is assumed that govemment spending can only be financed
by seigniorage. It is immediately now clear why centr.tl bank autonomy may result in lower
social welfare, since a more independent central bank will yield lower inflation, but also a
lower level of output and a lower level of govemment spending.
253. MN:AtiUNN:ti IIN' l'N:N'1'RAI. ItANK INnN:I'M:NnN:Nt;N:
It is rather difficult to mwsun: the degree of legal independence of various central banks, let alone
the degree of their actual independence of the govemment. Cukierman (1992) has pointed out that
actual, as opposcd to furm:ll independence, not only hinges on legislation, but also on a myriad of
other fxton like informal amangements with govemment, the quality of the personnel of the bank,
and the penona) characteristics of key individuals in the bank. Obviously, these other factors are
virtually impossible to quantify. Most existing research has, ttx:refore, focused on legal
indepcndence and is rexlricted to industrial countries. !n section 3.1 four widely used legal
nwasures of central bank independence arc diuus.ced, while seetion 3.2 presents a critical
comparison o( the.w~ indicators. In section 3.3. some non-legal indicators of central bank
indepenclence arx~ n~vicwul.
3.1 l.egal measures of ccntral bank independence
Table 2 presents four nx~asures of centr~l bank independence, as developed by Alesina (1988,
1989), Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991), Eijffinger and Schaling (1992, 1993a) and
Cukierman (1992), respectively. For the various indices the following rule applies: the higher the
scon;, the more independent the central bank is. The measures of Alesina and Eijffinger-Schaling
range from I to 4, and from 1 to S, respectively. The index of Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini is
the total of their indicaton for political and economic independence (see below for further details).
The lowest actual swn~ is 3, the highest value amounts to 13. The value for their index of political
independence is shown in parentheses. This measure ranges between 0 to 6. The index of
Cukierman varies between 0 and I.




Alesina Grilli, Masciandaro Eijffingu-Schaling
and Tabcllini'





2 7(I) 3 0.19
Canada 2 I I(4) I 0.46
flenmark 2 8(3) 4b 0.47
Finlsnd 2 - 3b 0.27
France 2 7(2) 2 0.28
Germany 4 13 (6) 5 0.~




7 (3) - 0.39
Ireland -
Italy 1.5 5(4) 2 0.22
lapan 3 6 (1) 3 0.16
Netherlands 2 10 (6) 4 0.42
New Zealand 1 3(0) 3b 0.27
2 2b 0.14
Norway -
Portugal - 3 ( I) Zb -





















' The measurc of Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini is the index for political and economic indepe~dence. Their index for
potitical indepettdence is shown in parentheses.
b These eztensions of the Eijffinger-Schaling indea are based opon Eijffingu and Van Keukn (1995). The renlcing of
these countries rcfers to rolatively new ccntral Mnk laws (adjusted during the last ten years), except for Denmark.
27Although the VanOUS indicators are all ba.eed on a similar approach, it follows from table 2
that they show sometimes very different outcomec For instance, according to the measure of Grilli,
Masciandaro and Tatx~llini the Greek central bank has little autonomy, wherras this bank is
rclatively indepc;ndenl :KCOrding to the r~nking of Cukierrrwn (1992).
'fïre mensure uf Alr.cinn ( I9ti1{, 19t39) is primarily based on a paper by Bade and Parkin (1988),
which wa.e never puhlishul, cla.csifying central banks into four groups, with a score of I(most
dependent) to 4(most independent). Bade and Parkin analyze central bank laws applying the
following criteria:
I. is the centr~l bank the final authority'?;
2. is there no govemrm~nt official (wilh or without voting power) on the bank policy board'?;
3. an~ more than half uf tlx~ policy boarcl appnintnn~nts made independently of the government'?
For central banks with the highest degree of autonomy lhe second question is answered in the
negative, ancl tlx: qucstions I and 3 in the aftirmative. Bade and Parkin (1988) find the following
orck:ring: typc I: Auxlr.dia; type 2: Betgium, Canada, France, ttaly, the Netherlands, Sweden and
the United Kingdom; type 3: lapan, United Statex; and type 4: Germany and Switurland. The
numerical values of thc Alesina index are identical to those of the Bade-Parkin index, except for
the case of Ilaly. Thix different evaluation is based on the divorce ('divotzid) between the
Trea.eury and the Barxa d'Italia in 1981, after which the Banca d'Italia was no longer obliged to
absorb aIl excesx supply of short-term Treasury bills. This step decreased the scope for monetary
f-inancing of govemnx:nt dclicits and increased the independence of the Italian central bank. On the
basis of information from Fair (1980) and Mascandiaro and Tabellini (1988), Alesina adds the
following countries: Denmark, New Zealand, Norway and Spain.
The index oj Gri!!i, Masciandaro and Tabe!lini (1991) consists of two parts: political and
ec:onomic independence. The first yardstick measure.e the capacity to choose the final goal of
monetary policy; the second yardstick proxies for the capacity of the central bank to choose it,
instruments of monetary policy independently. The degree of political independence is determined
using eight criteria:
1. is the govemor not appointed by the government?;
2. is the govemor appointed for more than five years?;
3. are all policy tward members not appointed by the govemment?;
4. is the txilicy board appointed for more than 5 yean?;
S. is thero no mandatory participation of a government representative in the policy board?;
6. is government appruval of monetary policy required?;
287. are there statutory requirements that the bank pursues monetary stability among its goals?;
8. are there legal provisions that strengthen the bank's position in case of conflict with the
government?
Germany and the Netherlands score highest on this political independence index. Grilli et al. also
Iook at ecanomic independence. The numerical coding for this mtaasure is determined on the basis
of the following eight items:
I. is the direct credit facility not automatic?;
2. is the direct creAit facility based upon the matlcet interest rate?;
3. is the direct credit facility temporary?;
4. is the direct credit f:u:ility of a limited amount?;
5. dces the central bank not participate in primury market for public debt'?;
6. is the discount rate determined by the central bank?;
7. is banking supervision not entrusted to the central bank?;
8. is banking supervision not entrusted to the central bank alone?
Again, the Dcutsche Bundesbank appears to be the mnst independent central bankZ~
With respect to the last two criteria oF the economic independence mea.cure some additional
comment.c are in order. In the debate on the question of whether central banks should be entrusted
wilh prudential supervising powen, various arguments have been put forwurtl in support of both
views (see Roll et al. (1993) and De Beaufort Wijnholds and Hoogduin (1994)). The most
important argument in favor of separating monetary policy and ptvdential supervision functions is
based on the fear that the central bank's anti-inFlationary stance would be undertnined by a large
injection of liquidity, aimed at keeping one or more important financial institutions from going
under. However, even if banking supervision is performed by another agency, the central bank will
have to intervene in case one of the Iarger banks may go bankrupt. De Haan and Sturtn (1992)
therefore conclude that whether or nor a central bank is entrusted with banking supervision, has
little impact on its independence.
On the basis of the following features Ei~nger and Schaling (1992, 1993a) have developed an
altemative measure for central bank autonomy:2a
23 According to Alesína and Grilli (1992), the European Central Bank receives ezactly the satne
scores as the Bundesbank applying both the politicul and the economic independence yardsticks.
u Recently, Eijffinger and Van Keulen (1995) have extended their sample of twelve countries
with another eleven countries generally based on recently introduced central bank laws. ~ltese
eleven countries have adjusted their central bank laws mostly during the last ten years, except
for Denmark.
29t. is thc bank thc urlc 1'inal Iwlicy authority; is this authority not entrusted to the central bank
alone, or is it entrusteJ completely to the government'?
2. is there no governnxrn ufficial (with or withom vcHing Ixiwer) on the hank policy txiard'!
3. are more than half ol' the policy board appointments made independently of the govemment?
If the centr~l bank has the sole responsibility for monetary policy, a country gets a double score. In
case of joint nsponsihility il gcts a normal su;orc and if only govemiMnt is responsible it gets no
score. In case of an aflirmative answer to questions 2. and 3., a country receives a normal score.
NijfFinger and Schaling add one to 1he total score - so lhat the least independent central bank gets a
scon; of one, anJ [he most independent bank receives a score of five.
The mcuxurr ujCukirnnun (LVAU) is also brrul upcm interpretation of various elements oi cen[ral
b:mk laws. These legal char~cteristics are grouped into four clusters:
I. the appoin[ment, dismitiwl, and term of office of the chief executive officer (CEO) of the bank,
usually the govcmor.
a) tcrm of ofliu (titir);
h) who apfxrints C'Ii0 (aPP)?
c) dismiswl of Cf:O (diss);
d) may CEO hotd othcr offices in governmc;nt (off)'?;
2. thc policy fortnulation cluster.
a) who formulatcs numctary policy (monpol)7;
h) who has linal word in resolution of con0ict (conf)'?;
c) role in Ihe government's budgetary process (adv);
3. the objectives of the centr.tl bank (obj);
4. limitations on tlu~ ahility of the central bank to lend to the public sector:
a) advances (IIa); -
b) securitized lending (Ils);
c) terms of lending (Idec);
d) potential borniwcrs From the bank (Iwidth);
e) how are limits defined (ItYpe)?;
f) maturity of Icums (Imat);
g) which intcrcxt ratc is bcing applied (lint)?;
h) is thc ccnlral bunk prohihited From buying or ualing govemment securities in the primary
market (Iprim)'?
Nor each of th~u: variahlcx Cukierman discerns various possibilities, which get a numerical coding
ï0between zero and one. For instance, in the third cluster the following possibilities exist: price
stability is the major or only objective and in case of conFlict the central bank has the final worà
(I); price stability is the only objective (0.8); price stability is one goal, with olher compatible
objectives (0.6); price stability is one goal, together with other, potentially conflicting objectives
(0.4); the charter dces not state any objective (Q2); and, finally: stated objectives do not include
price stability (0). The numerical coding is shown in parentheses.
It follows from the foregoing analysis that Cukierman applies a certain weighing scheme. To
assess the overall independence of a central bank, this author has computed two altemative indices.
An unweighted index (LVAU), calculated as a simple average of the codings of the variables
obtained in a first round of aggregation (see below), and a weighted index. The first round of
aggregation includes the following procedure. The variables in the first cluster have been
aggregated into a single variable using the unweighted mean of the various criteria. The three
criteria in the second cluster are combined into a new variable by computing a weighted rnean (the
weights are: 0.25; 0.5 and 0.25, respectively). The last four variables in the fourth cluster are
aggregated into a single variable, using the unweighted mean. This gives a total of eight variables
(the three new ones and the five remaining variables). Cukierman's index LVAU is the unweighted
average of these variables. In Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) a weighted average of these
varíables (LVAW) is presented.
3.2 A comparison of legal independence measures
Although all mea.cures are, in principle, very similar, they yield rather different outcomes. This
impression is confirmed by table 3 which shows Kendall's rank correlation ccefficients of the
various measures. The Spearman rank cortelation is shown in parentheses. Especially the very low
correlation between the measure of Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini and Cukierrnan on the one
hand, and the Eijffinger-Schaling index on the other may be noted.
31Table 3. Itank correlation ccefficients of indices of central bank independence
Alcsina Grilli, Mascian- Eijtfinger-Schaling Cukiennan
dam and Tabcllini (LVAU)
Alcsina I 0.58 (0.(fl) 0.71 (0.78) 0.38 (0.44)
Grilli. M:G~ciandaro und - I 0.36 ((1.48) 0.52 (0.63)
T:Jw~llini
Eijffi~cr-Schaling - - I 0.20 (0.33)
Cukicnnan (LVAU) - - - I
Kendall rank wrrelalion aiefficienls (Spearman nmk correlalion coefficienls in parentheses).
There are at lea.ct lwo explanations for these diverging outcomes. First, Ihe interpretation of the
relevant bank laws diffen. In general one could say that for Ihose countries that some author is
most familiar with, different r.ulkings will occur. For instance, Alesina (1988, 1989) disagn~d with
Bade-Parkin's ranking for Italy. However, this did not lead to an upgrade of the Banca d'Italia, but
to a lower ranking. Eijffinger and Schaling (1992) conclude that, apparently, Alesina (1988, 1989)
has used implicitly a fourth criterium for Italy, namely: is the central bank obliged to accommodate
Ihe government budgct deficil? However, Alesina dces not apply this criterion to the other
countries in his sample.
In discussing the index of Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini, Malinvaud (1991) argues that the
Banyue Je Fr.mce is given a higher degree of independence than it actually has, since the governor
cuuld be removul any (ime by dec;ision of the French government. In a similar vein, we have some
doubts with respect to Cukierman's (1992) interpretation of the Dutch central bank ('Bankwet
1948'), which we are mosl familiar with. Table 4 shows the various codings of Cukierrnan and our
interpretation of the law. In parentheses our numerical codings are presented. It follows from this
table that in our view thc Dutch central bank is considerably more independent than Cukienrnan's
coding would suggest.25
25 The Dutch central bank tegislalion is apparently hard to interpret. Also Roll et aL (1993) are
clearly wrong when they state that there is a"17-member Council that advises minister of
guideline.c lhat Bank should follow in policy" (p. 27).
32Table 4. Cukierman's kgal variables: the Dutcb case
Varisbk: Cukierman's Interpretation: Comments:
(xe p.PM coding: (our coding is given in parenthesea)
for desaiption)
too 0.75 S ~ too ~ 6 board members appoiMed for aeven yeus; appoitttmetk is
tcnowabk
app 0.00 CF.O appointed by minista of correct, but on the basis of a list, containing only two
finarce names, which is drafted by the goveming ard supervisory
bnards ofthe benk (0.75)
diu 0.17 dismissal for policy reasona at only in case the miniater has given a so-calkd
executive branch's discretion "instntclion", which the goveming baatd n:ja:b, [he óostd
can be dismissed; such an itnttuctian has never been given
(0.g3)
off I.00 CEO prohibited from hoWing other corrcct
office
monpol 0.33 CB has only advisory capncity incorrecl: central óank has full freedom in formulating and
implementing monelary policy, eaapt for Ihe (tfteotdicap
pnuibility pointed oul above (I.00)
conf 0.20 govemmcnt has final authority in corrcct, but this process has nevcr ocwrted, aince it is
case of ~ronflict, hut subjed to linked with the "inuntction" procedure
process and praest by central benk
adv 0.00 central benk is nm given active role corcect. but oro may wonder whether this has anything to
in the formulation of govemment's do with centtal bank autonomy; indeed it may be argued
óudget that if the cb ia involved this may threatut iu
independence
obj 0.80 price stability memioned as only thc wording of thc law also implies extemal stability
goal
Ila 0.67 rclatively strict limits (cash amoum) correcl; collateral is necessary
Ils 0.00 no limits correct, but this type of creelit is not provided
kke 0.00 execulive branch decides the lertns inconect: the law specifics lhe lerms (0.66)
Iwidth 1.00 only centrrl govemmen[ can borrow not entirely correct, since Amstetdam and Social Insurance
Bank may also hurmw
Itype I.00 limit.c specified as cash amount correcl as far as anicle 20 of lhe Bank L~w ia concemrA:
however, additional liyuidity may be ptovided which is
limited in lemu of a pcrcentage of total govertttttent
n:venues
Imat 0.00 no uppu bound incarxt: madtrity is limiled to one year
linl 0.00 no intercat rate charge correct
Iptim 0.00 not prohibited from buying conect
govemment xwritiu in primary
market
33A second reason for thc Jiverging outcomes of various indicators is that various tneasures focus
on diffen:nt a.cpuas oF central bank independence. Eijffinger and Schaling ( 1993a) criticize the
mcasure of Grilli, Maxiandaro and Tabellini ( 1991). The rather large number of criteria that these
authon apply erode the weight of the imponant criteria, e.g. the objectives for the central bank and
appointing procedun:s ('watering down'). The indicator of Cukiemwn rnay also be criticized in this
respect. Hix aggregation procedunes imply thal the crítería which are in our view most important in
deterrnining central bank autonomy (i.e. the variables in clusters 1 and 3) get a relatively low
weight.
More generally, one could compare the.~e indices with respect to the four aspects of central
bank independence as outlined in the Introduction. Table 5 compares the various indices that have
been discucced. It follows from this table the various indicators focus upon different aspects of
central bank independence. As the various nteasures differ and show a low correlation it is very
dubious lo consttucl an indic:uor for central bank independence based on an average of various
independence mea.cures ati, for instattce, Alesina and Summers (1993) and Frrtianni and Httang
(1994) have done.
Table 5. Aspccts of central bank independence: a comparison of tive indicatots
Mcaxurc: Badc-Pnrkin Alesina Grilli, Masican- Eij~nga- Cukierman
(BP) (AL) d:vo, Talxllini Sclmling (LVAW)
(GMT) (FS)
maximum IiNal xaire: 4 4 16 S I.00
pc~~mncl indcpenJencr 2I3 ?l4 6II6 1J4 2I10
financial inJepemkrnx -- Il4 illó -- SIIO
Policy imlcpcndcncc Il3 Il4 Slló ?l4 3I10
of wnicn:
- inswmcnl iixlepcndcncc 3~16 3l20
- Bnalindcpcndcncc 2II6 3I20
343.3 Non-kgal measures of central bank independence
On the basis of a yaestioaartire under "qualified individuals in v;uious central banks" Cukiertnan
(1992) ha.c dcveloped a mcasure for centr.tl bank indcpendcnce.2ó Both an unwcighted (QVAU)
:mJ a weighted (QVAW) variant of this indicator is available. The yucstiunnaire contained
yucstions on the following issues: ( I) legal a.cpects of independence; (2) actu;d practice when it
differs from the stiputation of the law; (3) monetary policy instrurrtent~ and the agencies
controlling them; (4) intermediate targets and indicators and (5) final objectives of monetary policy
and their relative importanc:e. Unfortunately, the responding number of central bankers was rather
limited. Furthermore, an obvious methodological drawback of the questionnaire method is that
central bankers may benefit from providing a too positive impression of their índependence. One
may doubt whether perwnn~l of central banks is the most suited audience for a questionnaire on
central bank autonomy.27 Il,rwwcr, to the best of our knowledge, a similar survey has never
been organised among other participants in financial markets.
Cukierman ( 1992) and Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) have also developed a yardstick
for central bank autonomy based on the actual averagr rerm af ojj' ice of central bank governors in
different ccwntrie, J~~n~~b the period 195a1989. This indicator is based on the presumption that, at
least above some threshold, a higher turnover of central bank govemors indicates a lower level of
independence. The idea behind this measure is that, even if the centrnl bank law is quite explicit, it
may not be operational if there is a different tradition. A striking example is Argentina, where the
legal term of office of the central bank governor is four years, but where there it is also an
infonnal tradition that the govemor will resign whenever there is change of govemment, or even a
new finance minister. Consequently, the xtual average term of office of the govemor of the central
bank amounted to only ten months during the 1980s. This example suggests that the turnover rate
of central bank govemors may he a good indicator for the degrtx of centrrl bank autonomy28
Table 6 presents the avemge tumover rate of central bank governors for 55 countries during the
26 See Cukierman ( 1992), pp. 38(r391 and pp. 412-414.
27 Indeed, one could argue Ihat the diffen;nce between the legal independence measure and the
indicator based upon the questionairre gives some impression of the degree of overrating of
their independence by central bankers. For instance, for Italy the score for LVAU is 0.22,
whereas the score for QVAU amounts to 0.76.
zs However, a long term in ol7ïce may also indicate a low Icvel of indcpendunc:c as a rolatively
subservient governor will tcnd to stay longer in officc than a govemor who stands up to the
executive brrnch. Cukierman (1992) argues that this may be true for countries with
exceptionally low turnover rates such as Iceland, Denmark and the United Kingdom.
35forty years ending in 1989, for both OECD countries and sorne developing countries. From table 2
two conclusions can be drawn. First, the tumover rate differs greatly across countries and varies
between 0.03 (Iceland) and 0.93 (Argentina). Second, the average and standard deviation of the
tumover rate in developing countries are much higher than the corresponding measures for OECD
countries. The average tumover r~te in the industrial countries amounts to 0.13; the average for the
developing countries is (1.28. The highest tumover rate in the OECD countries (excluding Turkey)
is 0.2 for Spain and lapan. So, this measure of central bank autonomy hardly discriminates
between central banks of industrialized countries. This is not the case for four legal measures of
central bank independence. litese indices are based upon various aspects of central bank laws and



































































































37Cukierrnan and Webb (1994) have gone one step further. 7i~ey argue that the frequency of central
bank govemor transfers reflect both the ftequency of political change (e.g. regitttes shifts, or a new
head of govemment) and the fraction of political changes that are followed by changes of the
central bank govemor. 7iiey therefore develop an indicator of the political vulnerability of the
centml bank, which is defined as the fraction of political transitions that art; followed promptly (i.e.
within 6 rnonths) by a nyplacement of the central bank governor. For the period 1950-89 they
calculate that the avar~ge political wlnerability index amounts to 0.24. For industrial countries it is
0.10, while the index for developing countries is 034. Again, one should be careful in interpreting
this index. De Haan (1995a) shows that the score for the Netherlands of 0.10 of the political
vulnerability index is the result of pure coincidence.
384. EMPIlt1CAL EVIDENCE ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF CENTRAL BANK INDF.PENDENCE
This chapter takes a look into the empirical evidence regarding the link betwcen central bank
independence on the one hand and various economic variables, like inflation and economic growth,
on the other. Table 7 summarizes all studies that we are aware of, in which one or more of the
independence indicators are used which an: explained in the previous chapter. The second column
shows the indicato~~ of central bank independence used, while the third and fourth column present
the sample of countries and the e.ctimation period, respectively. The final column of table I
contains the economic variables that ure included in Ihese studies.
One conclusion that follows from table 7 is tfwt most studies are confined to industrial
countries. Only Cukierman (1992), Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992), Cukierman et al. (1993),
Cukierman and Webb (1994) and De Haan and Siernwnn (1995) also include LDCs in their
analysis. Another insight that follows from table 7 is that many authors focus on one rtteasure of
central bank inclependence only, so that it is not clear whether conclusions drawn are 'rt~easure
specific'. As the independence indicators employed focus on diffe~ent aspects of centrnl bank
independence (see chapter 3), it is important to use various indicators, even if the sample only
includes industrial countries. Some studies compare the results when severel indicators are used,
thereby ezamining the robustness of empirical results. As will be shown below, some outcotnes are
indeed depending on which indicator of central bank independence is used.
39"Publc 7. N:mpirical sWdi~w on lhc roauyucncr:x of ccntral Iwnk indcpcndcnce
Study: Mca.wre uscd': Coumrics: Estimation pcri- Varisbks esamined:
txl:
Badc ancl Parkin (19RR) BP 12 OECD 1972-1986 in(lation, inflation variabifity
cnumries
Akzina (I~ptlt, 19R9) AL 16 OECD 197.1-19RS in(lation. inflatínn variabilily
cwntries
Grilli, Max:i:urlart: and GMT IR OECD 1951L19R9 arrl inllalion, butlget deficit. output growth, and varia-
Tahellini ( 1991) coumries sultperiods bility of gmwth
De Ha:ut and Swrm AL, GMT, ES 14, IB and I I 1961-19R7 aml in(lation, inBation variability, output growth. growth
(19~Y2) OECD subperiods variability, Mtdgct deficit, central bank crodit to
ixtumries govtxnmau
('ukicnn:m ( I~)y2) LVAW, TOR 70 cuuMrics 1951119R9 and inlLuion, cemral bank crcdit to public scctor
anJ QVAW zuhpcricxls
I
('ukicrman. Wcftti and LVAW, 7nR 72 ccwmrias 195(119R9 arrl inllation, inBation variability, centrJl bank credit to
Ncyapi ( I'MYL) aml QVAW zubpcriods publk scctor
fkk Lang and Summcrs avcragc of AI. 16 OECD 195í-1i)tJ0 growlh of autput ptt worktt
(1992) aml GMT utumrics
Dc Haan, KmN atd GMT IR OECD 1979-19R9 disinBation awls
Sturm (199.1) cuumria
Pollard ( 1991) avcrJgc Of AI. IG OECD I973-19R9 budgct deficit and varianct of defu;its
amf GMT coumries
Aksina and Summixs avcrJ~x of AL 16 OECD 1955-I9RR inBation, inflation variabiliry, GNP growth,
( 1991) aml GMT rnumrics (1973-19RR) variability of gmwth, kvel and variance of
uremploymcm, kvel and variana of intercst rrte
Eijffingcr and Schaling BP, AL, GMT, 12 OECD 1972-1991 ancl inflation, infla[ion variabili[y, output growth,
(1993b) ES uwmries subzampks variability of gmwth
Havriksky and Gmnalo AL IR OP-CD 1933-I9R7 int)ation
(1993) twunlrics
Cukicrnun d al. (1993) LVAW, TOR atound 50 19G0-19R9 per capita gmwth rate, private investment,
coumrics ptoductivity growth, intercst rates
Dchclk and Fiw:hcr CMT and cam- IR OECD 196(F1992
~
inflalion, disinflation costs ~
(1994) puncn~s IM:nx~f awmrirs i
Fratianni and Huang avemgc of ninc IS OECD 19G0-1990 inflatán, inflation vaniability, output gmwth. I
(1994) indicators coumria vari~iliry ofgrowh
Eijffingcr, Van Rooij BP, AL, GMT, 10 OECD 1977-1990 inflation, inftation variabiliry. output growth,
aml Schaling (1994) ES, EMPh cnuntriea variability of growth, kvel and variantt of intercst
rate
41rDt Haan and F.ijffingcr AL, GM'f, l'S. 12. 11f anJ 21 1972-1991 and inll:nion, inltatiun variabilily, output gmwth,
(1994) LVAW OECD coun- 1977-g1 atW variabilily of gmwth
trics 19M2-91
Cbkierman and Webb politie:al 64 cewntries 1950-1989 innalion, inflalion variabilily, oulput growth, kvel
(1994) vulnerabílity and variance of interest rate
Walsh (1994) LVAW, GMT I 1 EC 1973-1991N2 disin0ation costs
countries
Pasen (1994) disinfluion costa
Eijffingu and Van BP, AL, GMT. 1 I countriex, 19g2-1993 inllation, inBation variability
Keukn (1995) FS including 3
Fsstem
European
Cargill (1995) LVAW 20 OECD variaus subpcri- inflation
countrics ods of 1962-
1991
AI-Marhubi and Wilktt LVAW. GMT, 21 OECD 1973-1989 inMtion
(1993) AL countries
De Hsan (1995b) cnmponents of 21 OECD 1973-19g9 intlation, inflation variability
LVAW countrics
GBrttter (1993) GMT, average of 9(16) OECD 1960-1988 disinllation costs
AL and GMT, countrics
LVAW
6c Haan unJ S:crmann TOR 4J LDCs 1950.19A9 inFlation
'i9~~~ ~ --~ .
BP is the index of Badc-Parkin: AL is is the indez of Aksina; GMT is lhc indcz of Crilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini; FS is lhe indez of
'.ijffingtt-Schaling; TOR is the turnnver rate of central bank govemors; LVAW is Cukicrman's Iegal intlependettce itdez, whik QVAW is the
tdex of Cukierman which is based upon a questionnaire.
See p. 47 for an ezplanation ot lhis variabk.
4.1 The level and variabillty of intlation
Table 8 summarizes lhe conclusions of studies dealing with lhe relationship between central bank
independence and inflation. The well-known inverse relationship between centfal bank
indepeftdence and the level of inFlation is supported by most empirical studies. An exception is
Cargill (1995), who argues that this statistical association is not robust and depends on countries
and time peritxls inciuded and on the regression specification. However, this argument is not very
41convincing as Cargill u.tie.c only one measurc of central bank independence~ Furthermore, one
would expect different results under fixed and under Floating exchange rate regimes (see also
Cukierman, 1995). Under the Bretton-Woods system of fixed exchange rates, countries were
committed to an exchange rate target and had little room to conduct an autonomous dornestic
monetary policy. Thus, the relation between central bank independence and inflation is likely to be
much les.c straightforward before 1973. Regression analysis by Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini
(1991) and De Haan and Sturm (1992) supports this view~ Indeed, one could argue that if no
evidence of a r~clationship betwcen independence and inflation is found in the Bretton Woods
period, while there exists such a link for the post-Bretton Woods era, this would strengthen the
argument that central bank independence is a primary determin:utt of a country's inFlation
perforrnance (Pollard, 1993). Still, many authors are not very careful in distinguishing between
exchange rate regimes.
Despite the overwhelming evidence in support of a negative relationship between central bank
independence and inflalion, it should, however, be: noted that a rn:gative correlation does not
necessarily imply causation. The correlation between both variables could be explained by a third
factor, e.g. the cultun; and tradition of monetary stability in a country, explaining both an
independent centrrl bank and low inFlation.31 Similarly, there may exist a two-way causality
between inflation and central bank independence. It is likely that less independence contributes to
higher inflation. Hawever, high inflation may also affect independence. As will be explaíned in
more detail in the following chapter, it can be argued that high inflation leads to more or less
central bank independence. On the one hand, high inflation may lead to political pressure for low
Zy Cargil) (1995) also presents the outcomes of various model specifications, without analyzing
which specification is to be preferted from an econometric perspective, which is also not very
convincing.
-~ Similarly, one would expect that the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the EMS (ERM) might
affect oulcomes. Ungerer (1990) characterizes the first phase of the EMS (1979-1982) as a
period of 'initial orientation' full of frequent and, sometimes, (arge realignments of central rates.
However, from 1982 onwards, the EMS enters a second phase of 'consolidation' (1982-1987),
and - after the accord of Ba.cle-Nyborg - moves into a lhird phase of `re-examination' (1987-
present). Consequently, the negative correlation between central bank independence and
inflation is expected to he less clear cut during the second and third subperiod than during the
fint subperiod, because of the priority EMS countries gave at that tirne to exchange rate
stability. Regression analysis by Eijffinger and Schaling (1993b) and De Haan and Eijffinger
(1994) supports this view.
~t The standard example is the case of Germany, where the hyperinFlation in the 1920s led to a
culture and tradition of monetary stability. See Bresciani-Turroni (1953). The determinants of
central bank independence will be discussed more extensively in the next chapter.
4'inflation, while on the other hand it may enwurage proc.esses that make it ea.cier for the
govemment to inFluence monetary policy, thereby reducing actual independence. This issue of two-
way causality is also not adressed in most studies. Cukicrman (1992) and Cukierman, Webb and
Neyapti (1992) deal with this issue by using two-stage least squares and instrumental variables.
They conclude thut there is a vicious circle between inFlation and low levels of inflation. When
sufficiently sustained, inflation erodes centrrl bank independence. Then low independence
contributes to higher inflation. De Haan and Van't Hag (1995) conclude, however, that high levels
of inflation in the past lead eventually to more central bank independence.
Most studies summarized in table 8 are confined to industrial countries. The work of Cukierman
(1992), Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) and Cukierman and Webb (1994) and De Haan and
Siermann (1995) refers to a broader group of countries. The.ce authors found no significant link
between legal central bank independence and inflation (or the group of developing countries. In
their opinion, this is a consequence of the fact that these countries have "less regard for the Iaw."
For industrial countries there is an inverse relationship with the legal independence measure and
inFlation. If the turnover rrte of central bank govemors is u.ced as a measure of actual
independence, there appeared to be a significant, negative relationship for developing countries.32
Similar results are found by Cukierman and Webb (1994) if the political vulnerability of the
central bank is used as indicator for central bank independence.
Most empirical studies consist of simple cross:cection estimates in which the aver~ge inFlation
rate is `explained' by some measure of central bank independence. However, some authors include
other explanatory variables as well. Grilli, Masciandaro and Tubellini (1991) and De Haan and
Sturm (1992) include some indicators for political instability. This dces not deprive the ccefficient
of the central bank independence indicators from their significance. Similarly, Havrilesky and
Granato (1994) take measures of the strength of corporatist structures into account, while AI-
Marhubi und Willett (1995) in addition employ indicaton for openness, degree of exchange rate
fixity and budget deficits. Again, lhe coefficients of the various indicators for central bank
independence remain significant.
32 Although there are only 22 observations available referring to the 198(h, the independence
index based on the questionnaire with central bankers also has the predicted sign and is very
significant statistically.
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S(ady; Inn:lllfNl: InlÍallnfl V:Ifl:lbdlly: COmIrICnIS:
BadC alxl 1':Irkln invcrsu: rclilllnntihlp no relatíon.cníp -
( IVxx)
Aksina ( 19xx, inversc rclminnship Icss panísan volmility in twt robust, as explained ín the
Iqgq) countrics with text
indcpernlcnt centrrl bank
Grilli. Ma.ui:lrldaro significant ncgativc -- other variab)cs inc)udod
and Tahcllini rclationship, caccpt for 195os
(1991) and 19bOs
Dc Haan mkl Slurm significaM ncgalivc rclati- significant cegative, other variables included
(19v2) onship, cxccpt fnr 1960s except for I960s
Cukicnnan ( I'M2) LVAW significant Gx OECD -- -
cuunlric., hut rwu kx LDCs:
TOR signilic:lnt in LDCs
Cukicnnan. WcMi LVAW signifir.mt for OECO idcm --
anl Ncyupti (1~)2) crwmrics, Ixd IwN RK LDCs:
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Sr:haling on.chip cxwpl fix GMT for GMT (political) basis
(Iy`)7b) (polilical)
Havrilccky and sibmificant ncgativc rclati- - measures for corporatist struMure
Granato (lyy3) onship also taken into account
Dcbcllc and Fischcr instrutnent indcpcnclellce and -- --
(1994) statutory rcyuircmcnt for price
slability arc significant, while
variabks rclaling tn appoint-
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Huang ( 1994) onxhip
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WillUt (1993) Iclationship and olher faclors thal may
innuencc innation also takw into
account
De Haan (1995h) signific:lnt negative idem --
rclationship with pmsy for
instrumcnt intlcpenJence
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Although there are many empirical studies on the relationship between central bank independence
and inflation, only two studies try to differentiate between the various aspects of central bank
autonomy. Debelle and Fischer (1994) decompose the independence measure of Grilli,
Maxiandaro and Tabellini (1991) into goal independence, instrument independence, and personnel
independence.33 They conclude that lack of goal independence (i.e. a mandate for price stability)
and instrument independence are most closely tied to inflation performance, while personnel
independence is not significantly related to inflation. Similarly, De Haan (1995b) has decomposed
the legal independence measure of Cukierman (1992) and relates its component.c to inflation. Using
pooled time series and cross-section data for a sample of 21 industrial countries, he concludes that
only instrument independence matters for inflation performance.~ Table 9 reproduces some
33 Goal dependence is measured as the presence of u statutory requirement that the central bank
pursue monetary stability among its goals. Personnel independence is nleasured as Grilli,
Ma.uiundaro and Tabellini's index of political independence, excluding the statutory
rryuirement. Finally, instrument independence is Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini's index of
economic independence minus the bank supervision criterion.
34 ~e proxy for personnel independence is the sum of all variables in the first cluster of variables
as distinguished by Cukierman ( 1992) and which have been explained in some detail in chapter
3. The proxy for instrument independence is the sum of the variables in the second cluster,
45results from these studies.
Tablc 9. Inilation and aspects of central bank independence
goal instrument personnel financial
independence independence independence independence
Debelle and - I.76 -I.02 -0.41 --
Fischer (1994) (1.02) (2.04)` (0.91)
-2.28 -1.02 -- --
(1.42) (2.04)`
De Haan 2.33 -2.27 -0.16 -0.58
(1995b) ( I . I 2) (-2.01)` (-0.26) (-0.95)
2.13 -3.02 -0.36 --
(I.It)) (-3.83j` (-0.58)
T-W:LLislic.c :tre in prrentMesex. Om: anJ lwo asterisks denote significance at 596 and 19F level, RSpectiVCly.
As expluined above, most empirical studies on the relationship between central bank independence
and inflation consist of cross-section regressions. There are also some studies in which a somewhat
different approach is followed. Capie, Mills and Wood (1994) investigated the relationship between
lhe level of inflation and central bank independence for twelve countries: Austria(-Hungary),
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, England (the United Kingdom), France, (West-) Germany, India, Italy,
Japan, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden and the United States. Based on the degt~ee of policy
influence, beginning between 1871 and 1916 and ending in 1987, Ihey classified central banks in
these countries in three categories ('independent', 'dependent' and 'unclassified'). During all
periods - before the First World War, in the Interbellum, during and after the Bretton-Woods
system - the nations with an independent central bank are continuously in the group of low-
inFlation-countries. Sometimes this group also includes countries with a dependent central bank.
except for wlxaher tlx, central bank has an activc role in the formulation of government's
budget, which has little to do with central bank independence. Goal independence is
Cukiernwn's (1992) score for the third cluster; according to Cukierman (1992, p. 377): "It
proxies the ... independence of the CB to elevate the target of price stability above other
abjectives. In Rogofl'x terminoiogy, it measures how strong is the 'conservative bias' of the CR
as embodied in Ihc law". Financial independence is proxied by the sum of most variables in
the fourth cluster as discerned by Cukierman (1992).
46Capie, Mills and Wood conclude, therefore, that independence is a sufficient, but not a necessary
condition for low inflation.
Johnson and Siklos (1992) use reaction functions of central banks, with the money market
interest rate a.e policy variable. If central bank independence can be rrteasured by the change in
interest rates, there are little differences across central banks considered. Their analysis covers
seventeen industrial countries during the period from 1960 till 1990.
Eijffinger, Van Rooij and Schaling (1994) apply a panel data approach to the reaction functions
of central banks of ten industrial countries during the 1977-1990 period, with present and past
inflation and real economic growth as explanatory variables of changes in money market rates.
They find a country-specific factor that these authors interpret as the degree of empirical central
bank independence. Regression analysis of average inflation on their empirical index of central
bank independence (EMP) confirms that having an independent central bank will lead to lower
inflation.
What is the empirical relationship between central bank independence and the variability of
inflation?
lnflation variability is positively cotrelated with the level of inflation. Chowdhury (1991) has
investigated the relation between the level and variability of intlation in 66 countries for the period
from 1955 to 1985. He concludes that during this period there exists a significant, positive
correlation between both variables. Consequently, if a high degree of central bank independence
results in lower levels of inflation, greater independence could also lead to less variability of
inflation. lndeed, many authors conclude that the variability of inflation - generally rneasuted as
the standard deviation of inflation - shows an inverse relationship with central bank independence,
which is in line with Rogoffs (1985) model.
There is another way to consider the impact of centr.tl bank independence on inflation
variability. As has been pointed out in chapter 2, partisan considerations will lead to inflation
variability if there is a regular change of govemment and if the monetary authorities are dominated
by elected politicians. In contrast, a relatively independent central bank will not change its policy
after a new govemment has been elected. So central bank independence may reduce inflation
variability over longer time periods. Table 10 updates and extends a table provided by Alesina
(1988), in which he analyses whether central bank independence has influence on inflation
differences under `right-wing' and 'left-wing' govemments. Only countries that during the 1980s
witnessed a governtnent change where a'right-wing' govemment was replaced by a'left-wing'
government, or vice versa, and where a meaningful comparison is possible, are included in table 4.
47The f"irst thrtie ruwx in table IO give an 'update' of the table provided by Alesina (1988). This
author concludes that inflation shows less variation between govemments with different political
orientations in countries with a relatively independent central bank. The lower part of the table
pre.tients our extension. It follows that Alesina's conclusion is highly dependent on the set of
countries included in thc analysis. If Australia, New Zealand and Norway are also included, the
results are less clcar cu1. Fint, under 'left-wing' govemrnents in Australia, New Zealand and
Norway the inflation rate is lower than under 'right-wing' govemments. Second, the inflation
differentials seem to be hardly related to central bank independence. Norway, for instance, has a
rr;latively dependent central bank acconling to the index of Cukierman (1992), while its inFlation
diff-erentials an; similar to those of Australia and New Zealand.
7'ablc lU. Average inflation in some OECD-countries under
`IeR-wing' and `right-wing' governments
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484.2 Economic growth and disintlation costs
In the foregoing analysis two arguments have been discussed why central bank independence may
stimula[e economic growth in the longer run. These arguments are (I) less uncertainty about
inflation, and (2) the better functioning of the price mechanism. Empirical research by Grimes
(1991), Fischer (1993) and Barro (1995) suggests that inflation reduces economic growth.3S This
may be explained by the positive correlation between the level and variability of inflation. Greater
variation in the rate of inflation can imply increasing uncertainty about inflation and may, thereby,
lead to lower economic growth. This relationship between inflation variability and economic
growth is, however, not supported by most studies. Logue and Sweeney (1981) find no significant
influence of inFlation variability on real growth rates. The same conclusion is also drawn by ]ansen
( I 989).
Various studies have examined directly whether central bank independence is related to
economic growth. Table II summarizes these studies. It follows from this table that various
authors conclude that central bank independence is not related to economic growth (or
unemployment). Despite the fact that a high degree of central bank independence is associated with
lower inflation in the long run, it follows from table I I that a policy of disinflation is apparently
not associated with high costs or great benefits in terms of long-run economic growth. Indeed, one
may be tempted to conclude that the absence of a long-run tradeoff between inflation and growth
implies that the establishment of central bank independence is a free lunch. On the other hand, it
should be recalled that price stability is, in general, regarded as an essential condition for
sustainable economic growth and that, accordingly, central bank independence would lead to a
higher level of economic growth. From this point of view, lack of a significant, positive relation
between growth and independence would, therefore, be rather disappointing. There are, however,
two studies that report a positive relationship between central bank autonomy and economic
growth. De Long and Summers (1992) found a positive relationship between central bank
independence and GDP per worker for their sample of OECD countries. Cukierman et al. (1993)
find that economic growth in the industrial countries is not correlated with central bank
independence, even after corrections have been made for other factors which may influence
economic growth. Using the frequency of president changes as a proxy for independence, they find
however, a positive relation between this variable and economic growth in developing countries.
A next yucstiun is, of coursc, whether there exists a relationship between centra) bank
independentt and the vnrintion of rconomic gruwth. Theory predicts different outcomes. According
35 ~is conclusion is, however, contradicted by a recent study of Karras (1993).
49to Rogo17 (1985), inck:puntk-nt central banks purt:hase a lower level of inflatitm at lhe price uf a
higher variabilily of rwl u:onomic growth. In contra.et, Alesina and Summers (1993) argue that an
autonomous centr.d bank will bc Ic.tis inclinul to conduct a'stop-go' policy which may limit
fluctuutions in economic growth. It follows from table I I that a higher degree of central bank
independence is not a.w~ociated with gteater v:uiation of real economic growth rates.
Table 11. ~mpirical studies on the relationship betwcen
central b?ank independence and economic growW
Study: Economic growth Variability of growth Lhsin(lation costs
Grilli, no relalionship no rclationship --
Masciandam :uxl
Talrcllíni (I~)I)
Dc Ha:m, arri no rclalionship no relatiixrshiP --
Sturm (1~2)
Dc L.oag ;uxl pasitivc rclationshiP. -- --
Summps (IYr)2) whik cwntmlling for
Whcr (achxs
Aksina arxl rxr rcla!ianship nu rckuioruhip -
Summcrs (1993)
De Haan, Knul - -- no rclationship
ancl Sturm
( I~M)3)
Eijffingcr ami no rclalionahip no rclationxhip --
Schaling
(lyy3h)
Cukicrman a al. no relationship if ncgalivc rclation bUwcen --
(1993) kgal index is uscd, variability atxl
but significant inJcpcndcncc proxierl by
rclationship ifTOR is TOR
cmploycd
Fratianni anJ no relalionahip no rclationship --
Huang (I~14)
Eijffingcr, Vnn no rclal'wnship no relationship --
Rouij arxl
Schaling (19N4)
Dc H:mn ancl no rclationship no rclatiortchip -
Eijffingcr
(I~J4)
50Cukicrman anJ political vulncrability - --
Webb (1994) ot central bank has
signiflcant ncgative
impxt on growth
Debclle arnl - -- significant
Fschcr (IY94) pusilive
n:lationship
Walsh (1994) - -- significant
posilivc
rclationship
Pnxn(1~4) - - significanl
positive
relalionship
G~rtner (1995) - -- significant
pnSÍUVC
relationship
The greater credibility attributed to independent central banks is often thought to reduce the costs
of subsequent policies designed to cut inflation. Increased central bank independence would tend to
shift the short-run Phillips curve inwards to the origin. Walsh (1994) has pointed out, however,
that central bank independence may also affect the slope of the Phillips curve. If, for instance,
independent central banks tend to foster an economic environment that produces nominal wage
contracts of longer duration or with less indexation due to smaller inflation variability, nomina)
rigidities in the economy will increase, thereby flattening the slope of the Phillips curve. The effect
on the slope of the short-run trade-off between unemployment and inflation will raise the real
economic costs of a policy to diminish inflation. This could in turn reduce, and potentially offset,
the reduced costs of disinflation attributed to the gain in credibility that comes with increased
independence.
Another argument why there may be a positive relationship between central bank independence
and the costs of disinflation has been put forward by Giirtner (1995). In a framework of staggered
wage contracts and relative-wage considerations, disinflation must start slowly and only pick up as
the bulk of wage contracts has been renegotiated to keep disinFlation costs at a minimum (see also
Taylor, 1983). As more independent central banks are likely to disinflate faster, they will face
higher disinflation costs.
So, the net effect on the costs of disinflation is an empirical question. De Haan, Knot and
Sturm (1993) huve analyzed whether central bank independence reduces the disinflation costs
(measured as the cumulated unemployment rate over the period 198(}-89 relative to its average
level over 1973-79). They were not able to find any supporting evidence. Three more recent
51studies have also analyzed the effects of central bank independence on the costs of disinflation.
Debelle and Fischer (1994) compare the output costs of recessions in Germany and the United
States. It appean that the output cost of German recessions are similar to those of US recessions.
The sacrifice rrtio (output lost due to the reduction of inflation) in Gemiany is larger than that for
the US for all recent n~cessions, despite the widely assumed "credibility bonus" of the Bundesbank.
Debelle and Fischer also report a positive and significant relationship between the GMT index of
centr.rl bank independence and output losses. Similar results are reported by Gartner (1995), who
has also used other indicators for central bank independence.~ Posen (1994) also concludes that
the costs of disinflation are not lower in countries with independent central banks, even when
differences in contracting behavior are taken into account. AIl this evidence implies that output
losses suffered duríng rt:ces.cions have on average been larger, as the independence of the central
b:tnk increases. As Debelle and Fischer argue, this suggests that there is no credibility bonus in the
labor markets for more independent centrrl banks: they have to prove their toughness by
continually being tough. Similar results have been reported by Wrlsh (1994) for various European
Union (EU) member states. EU counlries with greater central bank independence appear also to
face higher costs of disinflation. Walsh ha.c pointed out that this positive correlation could arise
á:cau.ce inflation ís more costly to reduce at lower levels of inflation, and central bank
independence is as.ux:ialal with lower levels of inllation. However, this author also reports
evidence tlwt even after controlling for average inflation in a cross section regression of EU
countries, tln~ n~lationship hetween the trade-off parameter and centr~l bank independence is
pnsilive and significam. According to Walsh, Ihis evidence suggests that grea[er central bank
independence as n:yuirul under the Maastricht Treaty may lead to a rise in EMU of the costs
associated with Iwlicics designed to reduce inflation. Stitl, one should bear in mind that the
causality may run thc othcr way round. In olhcr words, perhaps countries with flat short-nm
aggregate supply curvcs are more likely to establish independent central banks. Walsh has no[iced
that Flat supply curves make disinFlation more coslly, but they also raise the temptation to stimulate
ttx ec,onomy and thus increase the inflationary bias of discretionary policy. This issue will be taken
up in chapter 5.
4.3 Other variables
It follows from the prec;eding analysis that greater central bank independence is associated with
~ G3rtner's results arc, however, not in line with Taylor's (1983) model, as there is no
relationship between central bank independence and the speed of disinFlation.
52lower inflation rates. Through the Mundell-Tobin effect this may result in higher (ex post) real
interest rates. De Haan and Sturm (1992) find some limited support for the Mundell-Tobín effect:
low inflation countries have, usually, high (ex post) real interest rates. It could, however, also be
argued that a more. independence dampens inFlationary uncertainty and, by the Mascaro-Meltzer
effect, brings down (ex post) real interest rates.37 These opposite effects on the real interest rate
might also explain why the net effect on economic growth turns out to be insignificant. Alesina
and Summers (1993) examined the link between central bank indepertdence and the (ex post) real
interest rate and found no clear relationship. Nevertheless, these authors discoverrA a negative
correlation between central bank independence and the variability of (ex post) real interest rates.
Table 12. Empirical studies on the relationship between central bank independence
and other economic variables
Study: Intercst Budget deficit Cenlral bank credi[
Grilli, - negalivc, bul insignificant effect -
Masciandaro and
Tabellini (1991)
lk Haan and - mixat results (AL and GMT sume[imes only significant for GMT
Sturm (1992) significant; ES not)
Cukierman -- -- TOR significant in sample
ttyy2) including all counlries
Cukiorman, - - TOR significant in sampk
Webb and including all counvies
Neyapti (1992)
Alesina and no relalionship, - --
Summers (199J) but lower variance
of interest rates
pollard - no significant relationship with level, but -
(19g3) significant lower variance of deficits
37 According to Mascaro and Meltzer (1983), monetary and inflationary unceriainty - measured by
the variability of (unexpected) money growth and inflation, respectively - will result in a risk
premium which risk-avers investors demand to compensate for this uncertainty and, thereby, in
a higher (ex ante) real inten:st rate. See also Bomhoff (1983).
53Eijffinger, Van xignificanl -- --
Rooij and ncgativc
Schaling (1994) rclalionship for











Is there, finally, some relationship between central bank independence and (the monetary
:u.commodation of) budget deficits of the government? One would expect that an independent
central bank is in a better position to resist the pressure of its government to accommodate budget
deficits by means of monetary financing. Moreover, the government has a strong incentive, in the
case where budget deficits are financed on the capital market, to reduce the deficit because of
future interest payments. Parkin (1987) investigated the relationship between central bank
independence and the govemment deficit as a ratio of Gross National Product in the long run for a
sample of twelve countries during the period 1955-1983. The two countries with the most indepen-
dent central bank - i.e. Germany and Switzerland - appear to have almost no government deficits
in the period considered by Parkin.
Masciandaro and Tatx;llini (1988) examined fur five countries - Australia, Canada, Japan, New
7.ealand and the Unitul Slates - the budget deficit as a r~tio of Growe Uomestic (National) Pn~ducl
during the period 1971)-1985. They found that New Zealand with - until recently - the most
dependent central bank had the highest average deficit over this period, while the United States
wilh - according to Marciandaro and Tabellini - the most independent central bank had a deficit
equal to the deficit of the remaining three countries.
Grilli, Masclandam and Tabellini (1991) find for their measure also a negative correlation
between the deficit and the degree of independence in the period 195(}-1989, which is however not
significant. Their r~esults are supported by De Haan and Sturm (1992), in particular for the
subperiod 1979-19873g Pollard (1993) finds some negative correlation between central bank
~g It should, however, be stressed that in case of the GMT index there is the danger of circular
reasoning because the (madified) GMT index comprises at least four elements of monetary
accommodation of govemment deficits. Therefore, the empirical evidence found by Grilli,
54independence and the deficit-to-GDP ratio that appears, however, not to hc significant. Quite
strangely, Pollard discovers a significant, negative relationship with the variance of the budget
deficit, as a perccn[age of GDP.
Our prudent conclusion is, that an independent central bank cannot restrain its govemment from
creating budget deficits, but that it may have some restrictive influence on fiscal policies pursued
by its government.
What should we make of the preceding review of empirical studies on lhe relationship between
central bank independence and macroeconomic variables, like inflation and growth? Is it ttve, as
Grill, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991, p. 375) claim, that "having an independent bank is almost
like having a free lunch; there are benefits but no apparent costs in terrns of macroeconomic
performance"? Although there is overwhelming evidence that central bank independence and
inflation are negatively related, one should be careful in jumping to this conclusion. As has been
pointed out, there is only limited support for Ihe view that central bank independence stimulates
economic growth, while central bank independence also dces not reduce disintlation costs.
Furthermore, central bank independence may be endogenous, in the sense that countries with a
commitrnent to price stability may have a gtrater propensity for centtal bank independence. If true,
the mere establishment of a central bank with a commitment to price stability will not bring
inflazion benefits to a country. [n the following chapter we will analyse the determinants of central
bank independence.
Masciandaro and Tabellini and De Haan and Sturrn is not surprising at all.
555. THE DN71'ERMINANTti OF CENTRAL BANK INUEPENUENCF.
The previous chapters have made it clear that the degree of central bank independence varies
strongly among OECD countries. 7iie question arises which factors ultimately determine the degree
of central bank independence. It is quite remarkable, that the literature dealing with this question
is, so far, hardly developed.
Before discussing some determinants of central bank independence in grrater detail, we start by
a broad review of the recently developed theory.
Cukiemian (1994) presumes that the delegation of monetary policy to (partly) independent central
banks is u.cecl as a'(partial) commitment device'. By specifying the objectives of the central bank
more or less tightly and by giving it broader or narrower powers, politicians determine the extent
of their commitment to a policy rule. The stronger their commitment and, thus, the more
independent a central bank is, the more costly it will be for politicians to override decisions of the
central bank. Cukierman wants to identify the economic and political factors that induce politicians
to delegate more or less authority to the central bank. Attempts to use monetary policy to stimulate
economic activity and finance public expenditure will lead to a(suboptimally) high inFlation rate.
This inflationary bias may be reduced in by giving the central bank independence, i.e. a mandate to
strive for price stability as the single policy goal. Such policy action leads to more credibility of
monetary policy which, in lum, is n;flected in lower inflationary expectations and, thereby, lower
(capitnl market) interosl rates and more moderate wage demands. From the politician's viewpoint,
the costs of an independent central bank consist mainly of the loss of flexibility in monetary policy
making. The fiakuice herween flexibi[ity and credibility, depending on the televance of various
economic and politic:d factors to delegate authority, determines the optimal degree of centml bank
autonomy in a country. Inspired by this theoretical model, Cukietman has formulated a number of
propositions on the economic and political determinants of central bank independence which will
be discussed in the next sections of this chapter.
Eijffinger :md Schaling (1995) combine the model of wage and employment deterrnination of
Alogoskoufis (1994) with the Rogoff (1985) model. They assume two types of agents, i.e. wage-
setten (the union) and the central bank. Wage-setters unilaterally choose the nominal wage rate,
whereas the central bank controls the inflation rate. The timing of events in the model is as
follows. In the lint stage, wage-setters sign nominal wage contracts for a certain period, e.g. one
year. In the second stage, stochastic shocks to productivity occur. Because of their randomness,
S6these shocks cannot be known at the time the wage contracts are signed. In the third stage, the
central bank observes the values of the praluctivity shocks and - contingent on the chosen
monetary regime - reacts to the shocks accordingly. In the fourth and final stage, employment is
determined by competitive firms. Based on this model, Eijffinger and Schaling derive a number of
propositions with napect to the economic and political determinants of central bank independence
that will also be neviewed in this chapter.
Based on these or other theoretical considerations, various economic and political determinants of
central bank independence have been formulated. Such determinants can be categorized as
follows:39
I. the equilibrium or natural rate of unemployment
2. the stock of govemment debt;
3. political instability;
4. supervision of financial institutions;
5. financial opposition to inFlation;
6. public opposition to inFlation; and
7. other determinants.
Table 13 summarizes empirical studies on the determinants of central bank independence. The
several column shows the measure(s) of central bunk independence used. The third and fourth
column present the sample of countries and the estimation period, respectively. The last column
contains the economic and political variables examined in these studies.
5.1 The equilibrium level of unemployment
The first determinant of central bank independence may be the average employment-motivated
inflationary bias in a country. This inflationary bias can be approximated empirically by the
3y Of course, these seven determinants are not mutually exclusive and may (partly) overlap.
57Table 13. Empirical studies on the delet-minants of central bank independence
Study: Mea.cure(s) Countries: Estimation period: Variables exami-
used: ned:
Cukierman (1992) LVAU and 14 mickfle inco- 1972-1979 and pulitical instability
LVAW me countries 1980-1989 (party and regime)
Posen (1993a) LVAU 17 OECD coun- 1950-1989 financial oppositi-
triex on to inFlation
(FOI)
lh~ Hran and Van 't GMT, LVAU 19 (16) OECD 1980-1988 natural mte uf
Hag (1994) and SUMLV coumrie.c unemployment
(NAIRU),





17 OECD 1950-1898 banking supervisi-
countries on, universal ban-
king,
16 (13) OECD 1900-1940 very long-tertn
wuntries inflation
Cukierman and pnlitical vulne- G4 OECD and 1950-1989 four rypes of poli-
Webb (1994) rability developing coun- tical instability
tries (high and low
leveq
De Haan and Sier- TOR 43 developing 1950-1989 and pulitical instability
m:mn ( 1994) countries subperiods (party and regime)
Mener (1994) average of 22 OECD cuun- 1967-1990 political system
GMT and vies index (PSI), stand-
I.VAW ard deviation of
output growth
Eijffinger and AL, GMT, ES 19 OECD coun- 19G0.1993 (for natural mte of
Schaling (1995) and LVAU tries NAIRU: 1960- unemployment
(latent variables 1988) (NAIRU), relative






ees paid by resi-
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SRequilibrium or natural rate of unemployment 40 Cukierman ( 1994) shows that the larger the
average employment-motivated inFlationary bias in a country is, the higher are the costs for the
government to override the central bank, and therefore, the more independent the central bank will
be. Because in the ca.ce of nominal wage contracts, unexpected inFlation has positive effects on the
level of both production and employment, a higher equilibrium or natural rate of unemployment
implies that surprise inflation is more valuable for govemment41
De Haan and Van 't Hag ( 1994) have tested this hypothesis, using two measures of Cukierman
(LVAU and SUMLV)42 and the index of Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (GMT). Proxies for
inflationary bias are the equilibrium rete of unemployment, as estimated by Layard, Nickell and
Jackman (1991) for nineteen OECD countries, and the difference between the actual and the
equilibrium rate of unemployment during the 1980s. In simple cross-country regressions with each
measure of central bank independence as dependent variable, the ccefficients of both proxies
proved to be insignificant.
On the basis of a game-theoretical model, Eijffinger and Schaling ( 1995) propose that the
higher the natural rate of unemployment is, the higher the optimal degree of central bank
independence will be. The intuition behind this proposition is as follows. A higher natural rate of
unemployment Ieads to a higher time-consistent rate of inflation and, consequently, to an increase
in society's credibility problem. Hence, with an unaltered relative weight placed on inflation
stabilization versus unemployment stabilization, the monetary authorities's commitment to fighting
inFlation is now too low. Eijffinger and Schaling tested this proposition, using estimates of lhe
NAIRU by Layard, Nickell and lackman ( 1991) as proxies for the natural rate of unemployment,
for nineteen industrial countries during the period 19G0-1988. They employed a latent variables
method (LISREL) in order to distinguish between the actual (legal) and optimal degree of central
bank independence in these countries. As measures for actual central bank autonomy, the indices
of Alesina, GMT, Eijffinger-Schaling (ES) and Cukierman (LVAU) were chosen. These authors
~ In this case the natural degree of unemployment is referred to as the non-accelerating inflation
rate of unemployment or, brieFly, NAIRU. Of course, this implies that the desired
unemployment rate is being held constant and, thus, that the inflationary bias is driven by the
difference between the desired and natural unemployment rate. This assumption is questionable.
41 An analysis with an endogenous NAIRU and its implications for the optimal degree of central
bank independence is given by Schaling (1995).
4Z The index SUMLV measures the tntal score of sixteen legal variables of Cukierman (1992)
with respect to ( I) the appointment, the dismissal and the term of office of the central bank
president, (2) the solution for conflicts between the govemment and the central bank, (3) the
policy goals of the central bank, and (4) the legal limitations for the government to borrow with
the central bank.
59found an insignificunt ccefficient for the natural rate of unemployment.
Therefore, we may conclude that empirical studies do not provide support for any relationship
between the equilibrium or natural rate of unemployment and the degree of central bank
independence.
5.2 Government dcbt
The stack of government debl is another potential determinant of central bank independence. The
larger the sum govemment want.c to borrow on the capital market, the mone weight is placed on
lower inFlationary expectations and, thus, on lower nominal capital market interest rates. The
benefits of a once-and-for-all reduction of the real value of govemment debt by unexpected
inflation do not outweigh in this case the costs of permanently higher interest payments as a
consequence of lower credibility. Cukierman ( 1994) has argued that the larger the debt, the more
politicians tend to delegate authority to the central bank and the more independent the central bank
will be. Moreover, whcn capital markets are deep it is likely, in his opinion, that govemments will
try to mise more funds through the capital market and, thereby, will delegate more authority to the
central bank. According to Cukierman, this conclusion is supported by the observation that the
most independent centatl banks are established in countries with well-developed capital markets,
such as Germany and the United States. Counter~xamples are Japan and the United Kingdom
which have relatively dependent central banks.
This hypothesis has also been empirically investigated by De Haan and Van 't Hag (1994) for
several measuns of indcpendence (LVAU, SUMLV and GMT) during the period 1980-1989.
Using gross government debt as a percentage of GDP in their regression analysis, these authors
again found no significant ccefficient for the debt ratio.
5.3 Political instability
The influence of political instability on central bank independence is, at first sight, less obvious
than the impact of factors discussed so far.43 On the one hand, it could be argued that, when
politicians in office are faced with a greater probability that they will be rettroved from office, they
have a stronger interest in delegating authority to the central bank as an apolitical institution, in
4~ For the effect of political instability on variables like the (incn:ase of) the stock of govemment
debt and seigniorage, we refer to Persson and Svensson (1989), Alesina and Tabellini (1990),
Tabellini and Alesina (1990), CukietTrtan, Edwards and Tabellini (1992) and De Haan and
Sturm (1994).
60order to restrict the range of policy actions available to the opposition in case the latter will come
into office. This implies that greater political instability leads to a more independent central bank.
On the other hand, we might argue that the incumbent politicians will fortify their hold on the
central bank, if there is a greater probabilíty of govemment change, and will eventually overrule
central bank decision making. The short-term benefits of surprise inflation can, thereby, exceed its
long-term costs. It follows that gre.ater political instability would nsult in a more dependent central
bank.
Cukierman (1992) sees, however, no contradiction between the two hypotheses. According to
this author, it is possible to combine both hypotheses into one single, intemally consistent
hypothesis. In countries with a sufficiently high degree of national consensus, gneater political
instability may be associated with increased independence of the central bank, whereas the reverse
can apply for countries with a relatively low level of national consensus. Cukierman has tested this
combined hypothesis using two indices of political instability - constructed by Haggard, Kaufman,
Shariff and Webb (1991) - for fourteen middle income countries over the 1970s and 1980s. The
first index, party political instability (PIP), measures the degree of political instability under a
given regime - the frequency and extent of changes from a left-wing to a right-wing government,
and reverse - and refers to a relatively high level of national consensus. The second index, regime
political instability (PIR) - i.e. the number of changes from an authoritarian to a democratic
regime, and vice versa -, reflects the degree of political instability in case of a relatively low level
of national consensus. Regression analysis by Cukierman for legal independence measures (LVAU
and LVAW) during the periods 1972-1979 and 1980-1989 shows that the first index (PIP) has the
expected, positive sign and the second index (PIR) the expected, negative sign. If estimated
separately, both indices of political instability are not significant at conventional levels. When the
two indices are combined into one regression, the signs remain as before and the indices of
political instability become both significant at a 9896 level of confidence. This result may however
be questioned, as legal measures of central bank independence may not be a very good proxy for
actual central bank independence in developing countries. Recently, two studies have employed
non-legal measures of central bank independence.
Cukierman and Webb (1994) use a measure of political vulnerability - i.e. the fraction of times
that political transition is followed by a change of central bank govemor - as a dependent variable
and four types of political instability as explanatory variables for a mixture of developed and
developing countries during the period 1950-1989. Only high-level political instability (change in
regime) and the dummy for developing countries proved to be significant.
Using data on the tumover rate of central bank governors for 43 developing countries for four
61periods (1950-59, 196(3-71, 1972-79 and 198(1-89) as provided by Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti
(1992), De Haan and Siermann (1994) have estimated the relationship between central bank
independence and polítical instability. Proxies for political stability are the number of regular and
irregular govemment transfers (coups). In their regressions only the variable 'coups' exerts a
significantly negative effixt on central bank independence. The ccefficient of the proxy for party
political instability is posilive, but not significanlly different from zero.
in a recent study, Cukierman (1994) states that the larger the political instability is, the higher
the degree of central bank independence will be ".... provided polítical polarization is sufficiently
large" (p. 6S). The intuition behind this proposition is that the ruling party prefers a more
independent central bank, when the prospects for its re-election are slim. As the probability of re-
election shrinks, bent:fits of central bank independence increase in terms of n;stricting public
expenditure by lhe other (opposition) party. This hypothesis of Cukierman is investigated by De
Haan and Van 't Hag (1994) for three different measures of central bank autonomy (LVAU,
SUMLV and GMT) during the 197(k and 198(k with regression analysis based on 21 (for GMT:
18) industrial countries. Th~se authors used both the frequency of gavemment changes (CHAN-
GE), a.c well a.c the frcyuency of significant govemment changes (SIGNIFICANT) - i.e. in case
another p:trty or coalition comes to office - a.c indices of political instability. For the first index all
three measures of centr.tl bank independence showed a significant, negative relationship; the
u,cond is not significant. So, greater political instability leads to a more dependent central bank.
Thetefore, we may conclude that the empirical results regarding political instability are mixed, but
thc various studies an: very hard to compare properly as Ihey refer to different groups of countries,
diverging measures of central bank independence and various proxies for political instabilíty.
5.4 Supervision of financial institutions
A political-economic determinant of the degree of centra) bank independence can also be the
supervision of financial institutions ('banking supervision'). Goodhart and Schcenrnaker (1993)
analyzed the supervision of financial institutions in 26 countries. Table 19 shows that in approxi-
mateiy half of these countries the central bank is aiso responsible for the supervision of financial
inslitutions and, thus, that the function of supervisory agency is combined (C) with the responsibi-
lity I'or monetary policy. In the other half of the countries there is a separated (S) responsibility
betwu;n the central bank and the Ministry of Finance, or other supervisory agencies.
From table 14, in conjunction with table 2, it may be inferred that the supervision of financial
institutions has little impact on the independence of central banks. Practical policy in these
62countries, as a matter of fact, does not ullow clear-cut conclusions regarding the relationship
between a combined or separated responsibility for financial supervision and monetary policy, on
the one hand, and central bank independence, on the other. Hence, we will discuss the main
Table 14. Central banks and the supervision on finencial institutions
Supervisory Agency Combined
Country or




Belgium Banking and Finance Commission S
Brazil X C
Canada X S
Denmark Finance Inspector-.tte (Industry S
Ministry)
Finland X X S
France X Commission Bancaire C
Germany Bundesaufsichtsambt ftïr das S
Kreditwesen
Greece X C
Hong Kong X C
Ireland X C
Italy X C
Japan X X S
Luxembourg X C
Netherlands X C





Sweden Swedish Financial Supervisory S
Authority
Switzerland Federal Banking Commission S
United Kingdom X
United States X Comptroller of the Currency, C
FDIC and State Governments S
Venezuela Superintendency of S
Banks
Source: Goodhart and Schcenmaker (1993)
arguments for and against a separation of both responsibilities, according to CEPR (1991) and
Goodhart and Schcenmaker (1993).
6391te fint argument in favor of a separation of financial supervision and the conduct of monetary
policy is the possibility of a conflict of interests between both activities. A central bank,
responsible for supervision of the financial system and, thus, also for failures of financial
institutions, could be tempted to admit lower (money market) interest rates or higher money
growth than wcwld be desirable from the penpective of price stability, in order to avoid such
Failun:.ti~ A separatiun uf re.epunsibilities could, lhereby, increase the autonomy of the centml
bank. A second argument to separ.:te the authority on financial stability from that on monetary
stability is the b:ul publicity usually associated with failures or rescue operations. This bad
publicity could harm the reputation of the centrel bank in its function as a supervisory agency. A
los.c of reputation nuwy also affect the cnedibility of monetary policy. Separated responsibilities
could, therefore, underpin [he independence of the central bank in practice.
'lhe following argumenls can be fielded against a separation of financial supervision and the
conduct of monetary Fxilicy. First, the central bank plays a crucial role in the smooth operation of
the payments system and the associated financial risks. To limit these risks, it is reasonable that the
centrrl bank wishes to supervise and regulate the participants of the payments system. Furthermore,
lhe centr.d bank has a function as 'lender of last resort' for the financial system and has in that
capacity the ta.ck to supply instantly enough liquidity in the case of sttvctural liquidity problems or,
even, rescue operations. 7itis, again, would argue for a combined responsibility.
De Beaufort Wijnhulds and Hoogduin (1994) distinguish between general or macro-supervision,
and specific or micro-supervision. 7ltese authors consider the arguments for a separation of
responsibilities, such as a potential conflict of interest to be, only applicable to the micro-
supervision situation, tx'cau.se of the close contacts with individual banks. 'fitey conclude that it
appears possible to maintain central bank autonomy both when micro (prudential) supervision and
cnonetary policy are separated, as well as in cases where they are combined. The choice between
separ~tion and combination depends on the structure of the banking system and the conduct of
monetary pulicy in a cuuntry which is in tum associated with the relative size of its economy. In
xmallcr open industrial countries - e.g. the Netherlands - with an exchange rate target, the
pmbability oF a cunllict of interest between both activities seems, in their opinion, to be
considerrbly lower than in lhe case of large industrial countries with a monetary target, such as
~ As an examplc GcxxlhaA and Schcenmaker (1993) refer to the recent 'savings and loan crisis'
in the United States and its influence on thc policy of the Federal Reserve System. It is also
stated that the Fedcral Re.u;rve is smoothing ínterest rates because of financial stability. See in
thix respect chapter 7 of Cukierman (1992).
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Empirical evidence on the relationship between financial supervision and central bank
independence provides no uniform conclusion. Heller (1991) compares the average rate of inflation
- as a proxy of the degree of central bank independence - of countries with central banks which
have no, partial or complete responsibility for financial supervision. Central banks without any
supervisory authority generate, according to Heller, the lowest inflation and those with complete
supervisory authority the highest inflation. Consequently, he favors a separation of both .
responsibilities. In contrast, De Haan and Van 't Hag (1994) find no empirical relationship between
two of the thr~ee different measures of independence and an index measuring the degtee of banking
supervision (CBO). This index is taken from Posen ( 1993a) and includes also the central bank
restrictions on lending rates and on the amount of bank credit to the private sector. Only for one
measure of independence (LVAU) there appears to be a significant, negative relation with the
index for the degree of banking supervision. This result also contrasts with the view put forward
by Posen, to which we will now turn.
5S Financia) opposition to inflation
Posen (1993a, 1993b) advocates a new view of monetary policy and central bank independence
which are, in his opinion, determined by the degree of financial opposition to inflation, and the
effectiveness of [he financial sector to mobilize - through the political system - its opposition
against inflation. According to Posen, the causal relationship between central bank independence
and low inflation is illusory. His position is based on empirical research for seventeen industrial
countries during the post-war period. Posen holds that centrrl bank autonomy dces not have a
noticeable effect on cross-country differences in inflation rates. He argues that there is a third
factor which explains the negative con-elation between central bank independence and the level of
inflation: financial opposition to inFlation (FOI) in a country.
This author thinks that monetary policy is driven by a coalition of political interests in society,
because central banks will only be prepared to take strong anti-inflationary actions when there is a
coalition of interests politically capable of protecting their anti-inFlationary policy. In industrial
countries, the financial sector represents such a(powerful) coalition of interests. Therefore, Posen
developed a me:tsure of effective financial opposition to inflation predicting both the degree of
4s ~e explanation of this could be that an exchange rate target is mon; visible than a monetary
target and expresses, thereby, a stronger commitment of the central bank. See for this argument
also Herrendorf (1995).
65central bank independence and the rate of in(lation in the various countries.~ Posen has tested
fiwr propositions n;garding indicaton explaining and mc;asuring financial opposition to inflation:
I. countries with tinancial suaors having universal banking are expuaed [o have a stronger
financial oppcnitiun to inFlation than those without;
2. countrics with Icss regulatory power (supervision) of the central bank over the financial sector
are ezpected to havu more financial opposition to inflation;
3. countries with feck;ral systems of govemrnent are expected to have a more effective financial
opposition to inFlation; and
4. countries with less frrctionalization of the political party system are expected to have a more
intluential firtancial opposition to inflation.
Acconling to Piiu~n ( 1993a), these indicators constitute the ultimate determinants of central bank
inck;pendence and thc level of inFlation. He claims to have fourxl clear statistical evidence in
suppurt of a cauwl link hetween FOI on the one side and central bank independence (i.e.
Cukicrnwn's LVAU) and lower inFlation rates on the other, for the period 1950-1989. However,
Ik~ Ha:ut and Van 't Hag (1994) have tested the proposition of Posen on universal banking by
mwns of a dummy variable for the presence ( I) or not (0) of a universal banking system. Only for
one (LVAU) of lhe lhree independence indices they find a significant, positive relationship with
the dummy for univenal banking. As explaincd before, these authors report a similar finding with
resput to the relationship between prudential supervision and central bank independence. So it
scems that Posen's conclusion is sensitive with respect to the measure of central bank
indep;ndence u.sed.
Cukierman ( 1992) slate.c that countries with brn~utfinancial markets and a substantial amount of
fiiumciul intermrdiution are more likely to grant high levels of independence to their central
banks47 Hc urgue.e Ihat possible disruptions due to less centntl bank autonomy and more
inflatiun (uncerlainty) in tlx: praces.. of internx;diation áaween savíngs and investment arc
proportional to the sir.c of thc financial sector in a country. Consequently, Cukierman concludes
that counlries with Iargc tiiwncial markets are more likely to have more independent central banks
than c1o tho.w with narrow financial markets. This conclusion is, in his opinion, supported when
cumparing Ihe size ol' linancial markets and the ranking of central banks by overall independence
~' As stated by Poscn (1993a): "This implies as well that CB independence and low rates of
inJlcrtinn slwuld orcur ingethrr, withnut a cmisal link betwern them, because they both are
refleeaions of effective FOl" (p. 47).
47 S~ Cukierman (1992), p. 449. Of course, the broadness of financial markets and the degree of
financial intermediation are (strongly) associated with the deepness of capital markets.
66(for DCs: LVAU, and for LDCs: LVAU and TOR) during the 1980s. Countries with large financial
markets - e.g. France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States - have relatively
independent centra) banks, whereas those with nan-ow (intemal) financial markets - such as most
LDCs - have relatively dependent central banks. Nevertheless, we are of the opinion that a two-
way causal relationship exists between the size of financial markets and independence: high
autonomy and low inflation will also foster the development of financial marlcets.
5.6 Public opposition to intlation
Another important determinant of central bank independence is public support for the objective of
price stability or, analogous to the former determinant, the public opposition to inFlation48 It is
quite obvious, that this determinant may not be analyzed apart from the financial opposition to
inflation - as defined by Posen (1993a, 1993b) - but that it has, a much broader meaning. The
experience of the public with very high inflation or even hyperinflation in the past is, generally,
seen as the cause of such public opposition to inflation. Thís implies that there can be a two-way
causal relationship between central bank independence and the level of inFlation: on the one hand,
an independent central bank may foster low inFlation in the medium and long run, but on the other
hand, high inFlation may result in the very long run in the creation of an autonomous central bank.
There seems to be, a threshold value for the level of inflation above which public opposition to
inflation in a country will be mobilized and taken into account by the politicians. Cukierman
(1992) argues, however, that when sufficiently sustained, inFlation erodes centr,tl bank indepen-
dence after a while. Society becomes accustomed to inFlation (wages are for instance indexed)
thereby reducing opposition to inflation and the public pressure for an independent central bank.
Using cross-country OLS regressions with the average level of inflation between 1900 and 1940
as explanatory variable of three different measures of central bank independence (LVAU, SUMLV
and GMT) in sixteen (for GMT: thirteen) industrial countries, De Haan and Van 't Hag (1994)
have shown that there is a significant positive relationship between very long-term inflation and
independence 4`~
4s See in this respect Neumann (1991), Bofinger (1992), Debelle (1993), Issing (1993, 1994),
Eijffinger (1994) and Fischer (1994). Issing (1993) notes that ".... it is no coincidence that it is
the Germans, with their experience of two hyperinflations in the 20th century, who have opted
for an independent central bank which is committed to price stability" (p. 18).
49 ~ Haan and Van 't Hag (1994) have also ran regressions with average inflation during the
period 1950-1980 a.s explanatory variable, but are faced with identification problems as a
consequence of the very limited variation in legal central bank independence between 1950-
67Not roferring to the vcry long run, but to the medium and long run, Eijffinger and Schaling
(1995) come on the basis of their game-theoretical rnudel to the following proposition: the stronger
society's prefen;nces for unemployment stabilization relalive to inflation stabilization are, the
higher the optimal degn.e of central bank independence will be. The underlying intuition of this
proposition is as follows. If society becomes more concerned with unemployment, the time-
consistent rate of inllation gces up. Therefon;, sue:iety's credibility problem becomes more
prcssing. With an unahcred relative weight plac:ed on inllation stabilit.ation, the balance tx`tween
crufihility and Flexibilily neuls to br adjusted in favor of an increased commitment of the
authorities to fight inllation. Eijffinger and Schaling have tested this proposition with the number
of yean of sucialist (left-wing) dominated govemment over the total period studied (WLEFT) as a
pruxy for suciety's pn~ferance for unemployment versus inflation stabilization. Using a latent
variables methcxl (LISRIiL) to make a dislinction txaween the actual (legal) and optimal degree of
ccntral bank indepeniknce, they invesligated the Alesina-, GMT-, FS- and Cukierman's LVAU-
index, mcaxuring actu:d ccntr~l bank autonumy for nineteen industrial rnuntriés, during the period
19G(1`IrXJ3. These awhon found a positive relation between sa:iety's preferences for
unemploynx~nt relalivc lo inflation stabilization and the optimal degree of central bank
inckpendence, althuugh it was not significant.
In gcneral, thc conclusion may be drawn that central bank independence is strongly assaciated
wilh society's fundamental support for the objective of price stability. Notwithstanding the
theoretical and empirical arguments for an independent central bank as discussed before, not every
scx:iety and, thus, not every government will be prepared to accept such an autonomous position of
its central bank.
5.7 Other detcrminants
Recent literature on determinants of central bank independence, also mentions economic and
pulitical factors which cannot be categorized under the former headings. We will discuss these
dclerminants only bricfly here.
Moser (1994) lries to identify the conditions under which an independent central bank can be
credibly suppliui by politics. In his model he analyzes the interaction between a central bank and
two pulitical dccisiun IxxJics. Delegration is only credible if there are at leas[ two ve[o players in
thc legislative procexs anJ if they disagree to some extent about monetary policy. Moser constructs
19R0, and 19R(~ 1989.
~iha lx~liticul system inde.c (PSI) that reFlects differences in commilment ability of the politieal
systems~ Controlling for a potential effect of external real shocks, he finds a significant,
positive effect of his political system index on an average of the GMT and LVAU rneasures of
independence for 22 OECD countries during the period 1967-1990. Apparently, countries with
extensive checks and balances are a.esociated with more independent central banks.
Based on their game-theoretical model, Eijffinger and Schaling (1995) propose that the higher
the variance of producrivity shocks, the lower the optimal degree of central bank independence will
be. The intuition here is that if the v,viance of productívity shocks increases, ceteris paribus, the
economy becomes more unstable and, thus, the need for active stabilization policy becomes
greater. With an unaltered relative weight placed on inflation stabilization, the balance between
credibility and flexibility will shift towards more monetary accommodation by the authorities.
Eijffinger and Schaling tested this proposition with the variance of annual output growth (VPROD)
to approximate the variance of productivity shocks. Distinguishing legal independence (AL, GMT,
ES and LVAU) from optimal independence with the latent variables method (LISREL), they found
the expected, negative relation between the variance of productivity shocks and the optimal degree
of central bank independence far nineteen industrial countries during the períod 1960-1993.
However, the coefficient was insigniticant.
Furthermore, Eijffinger and Schaling (1995) state that the steeper the slope of the Pkillips curve
is, the higher the optimal degree of central bank independence will be. If the slope of the Phillips
curve incneases, the benefits of unanticipated inFlation rise. Therefore, it becomes rnore tempting
for the govemment to inflate the economy and, ceteris paribus, society's credibility problem gains
in importance. With constant relative weights on inFlation stabilization, the balance between
credibility and flexibility needs to shift towards more commitment to fight inflation. This
proposition has been tested by Eijffinger and Schaling with the compensation of employees paid by
nesident producers a.c a ratio of GDP (SLOPE) as a proxy for the slope of the Phillips curve. Using
the latent variables method, a significant positive relationship was found between the slope of the
Phillips curve and the nplimal degree of central bank independence for ninetecn industrial countries
in the period 196(1-1993.St
~ This political system index ranges from a value of one for pure unicameral legislatures and
bicameral legislatures with both chambers being equally composed to a value of four for strong
bicameral systems, i.e. systems with equal power and unequal composition. The last are
characterized by a high degree of federalism.
St The latent variables method also enables Eijffinger and Schaling (1995) to estimate the optimal
degree of central bank independence and, thereby, to compare it with the actual (legal) degree
of independency. They conclude that some countries - notably Germany and Switzerland - are
696. CONCLWINC COMMNlN7S
In this survey, wc huvc discussed, in a critical way, the theoretical and empirical literature on
central bank autonomy and added some new estimates of the relation between central bank
independencc on the unc hand, and inflation and economic growth on the other. From our
discussion of various mcasures of central bank independence, it became evident that all measures
havc their limitations. It became also apparent that the concept of central bank independence as
us~ in most theoreticai studies, diverges somewhat from proxies of centr.tl bank independence a.e
used in Ibe empirical literature. Further research on the reliability of, and altematives for, the
various mea.cures is dcarly needed.
Is the only gocxl central bank a bank lhat can say 'no' to the politicians'?52 An independent
eentral bank is not a.5'U~cient andlor a neces'sury condition for price stability. The examples of
Japan and Greece, mentioned in the introduction, make this amply clear. In accordance with the
theorotical literature and previous empirical studies, we conclude, however, that a country with an
inck:pendent central bank, ceteris paribus, will have a lower rate of inFlation than a country where
politicians can steer thc central bank's policy. Attaining Iower inflation rates bears no costs in
terms of lower long-terrn exonomic growth. So, in principle, we may answer the above rnentioned
yuestion positively. The tendency towards greater central bank autonomy which can, presently, be
perceived in many countries should, in our opinion, thus be regarded positively. Nevertheless, with
respect to thix conclusion some important caveats are in order.
First, the uhsrnce ol' a significant inJluence of the various measures of central bank
indepcnderx;e on the rate of econamic grownc ~an also be interpreted in a less positive way. Stable
monetary policy aimul at low inflation is, usually, considered to be an important condition for
sustainable economic growth. However, neither our results, nor other empirical studies show that
central bank autonomy favors for ec;onomic growth and employment. Moreover, there is no proof
that countries with a rclatively independent central bank have lower costs of disinflation than those
with a mon~ dependent centr~l bank. lndeed, most studies suggest that central bank independence is
asscxiated with hi~her Jisinflation costs.
Second, lhe lendency towards central bank autonomy may conFlict with the goal of
nccoun(nbiliry of cemral banks. In the short run, there seems to be a trade off between central bank
characlerizul by a highur than optimal degree of independence and others - Australia, Norway,
Sweden and the Unitcd Kingdom - by a lower than optimal degree.
SZ Quotation fmm Tiir Economist of February I(Rh, 1990.
70independence and accountability. In our view, such a trade off dces, however, not exist in the
longer run. A central bank, continuously conducting a policy which lacks broad political support,
will sooner or later be overridden. At the same time, our conclusion underscores the importance of
broad public support for a central bank's autonomy and its anti-inflationary policy. Although the
determinants of central bank independence have only recently been investigated, cument resear~ch
leads us to the conclusion that every society gets the centrel bank it deserves. This conclusion
implies also that just a change of the central bank law is insufficient to guarantee structurally lower
levels of inflation. Only in case of wide-spread and overwhelming support for anti-inflation policy
by an independent central bank, will inflation effectively be reduced. 'Iite policy to give, for
example, the Banque de France a more independent position is backed both by the govemment, as
well as by the opposition parties. After the failed experiment of an expansionary policy in France
at the beginning of the 1980s, govemments of altemating political composition have chosen for a
monetary policy strongly focussed on Germany. In such circumstances, the development towards
an independent cen[ral bank is a logical step.
It is, however, doubtful whether there is enough support for a restrictive monetary policy in
some Southern European countries. More central bank autonomy is, then, no sufficient guarantee
for a permanently lower level of inFlation in these countries, becau.se a lack of support for anti-
inflationary policy will, probably, result in less central bank independence in the longer term.
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